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Abstract
We present round-efficient distributed algorithms for fundamental communication tasks
in the presence of a Byzantine edge in the CONGEST model of distributed computing. We
consider the strongest Byzantine setting where the adversary has an unbounded power, a
complete knowledge of the communication graph, and a full access to the random coins of
the nodes. In the Byzantine Broadcast problem, given is a network G = (V, E) with an unknown
Byzantine edge e′. There is a source node s holding an initial message m0, and the goal is
for all the nodes in the network to receive a copy of m0, while ignoring all other messages.
Perhaps surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, all existing algorithms for the problem
either assume that the Byzantine behavior is probabilistic, use polynomially large messages
or else suffer from a large round complexity.
We show the first round efficient algorithms for several fundamental distributed tasks
in the presence of a Byzantine edge. Specifically, we give an O˜(D2)-round 1 algorithm for
the Byzantine Broadcast problem, where D is the diameter of the graph. The communication
graph is required to be 3-edge connected, which is known to be a necessary condition. We also
provide a Leader Election algorithm in the presence of a Byzantine edge with the same round
complexity of O˜(D2) rounds. We use these algorithms to provide the efficient construction of
Byzantine cycle covers which serve the basis for obtaining also the following:
• A Byzantine BFS algorithm that for a given source s either computes a BFS tree rooted at
s, or else detects the Byzantine edge e′, and outputs a BFS tree in G \ {e′}. The algorithm
runs in Ô(D3) rounds. If the Byzantine adversary is oblivious to the randomness of
the nodes, the round complexity can be improved to Ô(D2) rounds. No time-efficient
algorithm for this problem has been known before.
• A general compiler that transforms any r-round algorithm A (in the standard setting)
into an equivalent algorithm A′ that runs in Ô(D3) · r rounds in the presence of a Byzan-
tine edge. This improves the time overhead by a Ô(D) factor, and also removes the
pre-processing assumption of the previous work.
We hope that the tools provided in this paper will pave the way towards obtaining round-
efficient algorithms for many more distributed problems in the presence of Byzantine edges
and nodes.
1The notion O˜ hides poly-logarithmic terms, and the notion Ô hides a multiplicative factor of an 2O(
√
log n) term.
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1 Introduction
We present round-efficient distributed algorithms in the presence of a Byzantine edge. Through-
out, we consider the standard CONGEST model [37] of distributed computing. In this model,
execution proceeds in synchronous rounds and in each round, every node can send a message
of size O(log n) to each of its neighbors. The Byzantine adversary has an unbounded computa-
tional power. It is allowed to see the entire graph, the messages sent throughout the algorithm,
and the internal randomness of the nodes. Within this setting, our goal is to provide efficient
distributed algorithms for fundamental computational tasks in general graphs. These algorithms
are required to preserve the correctness of the computation (despite the Byzantine attack) while
being also efficient in terms of the number of rounds.
Fault tolerant distributed algorithms [4, 18] concern with the efficient computation in net-
works whose nodes or edges are subject to Byzantine faults. A wide range of resilience and fault
tolerance notions for distributed networks have been explored extensively over the years. This
led to a plentiful list of algorithms for fundamental problems, such as Consensus [14, 15, 16, 22],
Broadcast [38, 34, 23, 35], Gossiping [6, 2, 8], and Agreement [13, 33, 9, 7]. See [34] for a survey
on this topic. A common theme in this literature concerns the feasibility of the computation, e.g.,
characterizing the requirements a network should satisfy for eventually reaching to an agreement
in the presence of Byzantine faults. The efficiency aspects, in terms of the number of rounds in
bandwidth restricted models, have received less attention.
In this paper, we provide a basic tool-kit to perform efficient computation in the presence of
a single Byzantine edge. This setting is turned out to be quite involved due to the unbounded
power of the adversary. We mainly focus on the Broadcast task and show its various applications
to the related problems of Breadth-First-Search computation (BFS), Leader Election, Diameter
Estimation and more. Our tools and the algorithm analysis are inspired by techniques developed
for designing fault-tolerant (FT) graph structures. The latter is a subarea of network design in
which resilience against faults is taken into considerations. The main focus there is on the design
of sparse fault-tolerant structures that preserve key properties of the underlying graph under
faults. A missing piece, however, in the classical FT literature is the actual application of these
structures by real algorithms running on top of the network. In the current paper, we take a
fault-tolerant perspective to provide efficient computation in the presence of Byzantine faults. We
hope that this work would fill in, at least partially, the current missing bridge between FT-graph
structures and reliable communication over faulty networks.
The Byzantine Broadcast Problem. In the Byzantine Broadcast problem, a single node s in a
network G = (V, E) has an initial message m0, and the goal is for all the nodes in the network
to receive a copy of m0, while ignoring all other messages, in the presence of a Byzantine edge.
The Byzantine Broadcast problem was introduced by Pease et al. [33] and Lamport et al. [24, 33]
and has been extensively studied since then. Most of the existing Byzantine Broadcast protocols
for arbitrary graphs focus on theoretical feasibility under various assumptions [12, 36, 26], rather
than on round efficiency. Broadcast protocols with guaranteed running time have been provided
only in specialized settings and topologies, e.g., for complete networks [17, 10, 13, 21, 9, 7, 27].
As all current algorithms for the problem in general graphs are limited by their unbounded
round complexity, the main question we ask in this paper is the following:
Can one design a round-efficient algorithm for the Byzantine Broadcast problem?
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As we will see, solving the Byzantine Broadcast problem serves the basis for other fundamen-
tal distributed tasks such as Byzantine BFS, Leader Election, Diameter Estimation and more.
Cycle Covers and Byzantine Compilers. To provide a general computational methodology in
the Byzantine setting, it is desired to devise a simulation technique. Our goal here is to com-
pile any given distributed algorithm A (in the standard setting) that runs in r-rounds into an
equivalent round-efficient algorithm A′ that performs the same computation in the presence of
a Byzantine edge. Towards that goal, Parter and Yogev introduced the notion of low-congestion
cycle covers [30] as a basic communication backbone for reliable communication. Roughly speak-
ing, for a D-diameter 2-edge connected graphs, these cycles cover every edge e in G by cycles
of length O˜(D) such that each edge appears on O˜(1) distinct cycles. The algorithm of [30] is
centralized and can be made nearly optimal in the sense that each edge e can be covered by a
cycle of length O˜(|Ce|), where Ce is the shortest cycle in G that covers e (if exists). The efficient
distributed computation of low-congestion cycle covers has been presented in [31, 32]. Specifi-
cally, they showed an Ô(D)-round algorithm that computes a cycle cover collection where each
edge e is covered by a cycle of length Ô(|Ce|), and the total congestion is Ô(1).
One of the key applications of low-congestion cycle covers is for reliable compilation of dis-
tributed algorithms. [30] showed that by computing these cycle covers2 in a pre-processing step,
one can compile any r-round algorithm A into an equivalent algorithm A′ in the Byzantine set-
ting. The overhead in the number of rounds is O˜(D4)3. The main limitation of the compiler of
[30] is its pre-processing assumption. In this paper we therefore ask:
Can one provide a general Byzantine compiler without any pre-processing assumption?
To address this question, we introduce the notion of Byzantine cycle covers. These cycles
have low-congestion, short length, and an additional key property that is crucial for the Byzantine
setting: For every non-Byzantine edge e, the cycle collection contains a cycle Ce,e′ that covers e but
avoids the (a-priori unknown) Byzantine edge e′. We give an efficient algorithm for computing
Byzantine cycle covers in the presence of a Byzantine edge, and use it as the basic primitive in
our compiler.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our main technical contribution is the first round-efficient algorithm for the Byzantine Broadcast
problem. We will assume throughout that the nodes have a polynomial estimate on the number
of nodes in the graph. (This assumption is quite common even in the context of local distributed
graph problems.) We start by considering a relaxation of the Broadcast task which we call the
weak Broadcast problem. In the latter task, the goal is to compute for each node u a small set
of messages Mu such that the broadcast message m0 appears in Mu, and in addition, the total
number of false messages in
⋃
u Mu is bounded by a constant. The weak Broadcast algorithm
plays a key role in our final Byzantine Broadcast algorithm.
2In fact, [30] designed a more specified cycle collection that covers each edge by two edge disjoint cycles, rather
than just one
3Since the cycles are computed in a pre-processing step we can construct them with nearly optimal length and
congestion and therefore reduce a 2
√
log n factor in the round complexity.
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Theorem 1. [Weak Byzantine Broadcast] Given a D–diameter, 2–edge connected graph G and an un-
known Byzantine edge e′, there exists a deterministic weak Broadcast protocol that in O(D) rounds deliv-
ers a message m0 from a designated vertex s with the following guarantee. In the output format, each node
v holds a set of messages Mv such that m0 ∈ Mv and |⋃v Mv| = O(1).
Interestingly, for the weak Broadcast task it is sufficient for the graph to be two (rather than
three) edge connected. Solving the weak Broadcast task already provides an important filtering
step that reduces the total congestion in the second phase of our algorithm. In this second phase,
nodes exchanges messages received in the weak Broadcast phase. A node will accept a message
as its final output, only if the message has been received over two distinct paths4. This second
phase of our Broadcast algorithm bares similarities to the algorithm of Maurer and Tixeuil [26].
The main advantage of our algorithm is in its considerably improved round complexity. While
the messages of [26] might be polynomially large, our key contribution is in providing an algorithm
that is adapted to the CONGEST model and runs in O˜(D2) rounds. We show:
Theorem 2. [Byzantine Broadcast] Given a D–diameter, 3–edge connected graph G and an unknown
Byzantine edge e′, there exists a randomized Broadcast protocol which delivers a message m0 from a
designated vertex s to all vertices in V within O(D2 log2 n log D) rounds, with high probability. In
addition, at the end of the algorithm, all nodes obtain a linear estimate (upper bound) for the diameter of
the graph.
Note that the requirement that the graph is 3-edge connected is necessary as was shown
by Dolev [12]. Using our Broadcast algorithm leads to a Byzantine Leader Election protocol,
provided that the nodes have a linear estimate on the diameter of the graph.
Lemma 3. [Byzantine Leader Election] Assuming a polynomial bound on the number of nodes and a
linear upper bound D′ = cD on the diameter (for some constant c ≥ 1), given a 3-edge connected graph
G = (V, E), there exists a randomized algorithm that elects a single leader known to all nodes in the graph
within O˜(D2) rounds with high probability.
We then turn to consider the design of Byzantine compilers that can simulate every given
distributed algorithm in the Byzantine setting. The compilers are based on a new notion of
Byzantine cycle covers, an extension of low-congestion cycle cover to the Byzantine setting, which
can be computed in the presence of a Byzantine edge.
Definition 4 (Byzantine Cycle Covers (BCC)). For a 3-edge connected graph G and an unknown
fixed Byzantine edge e′, a (c, d)–Byzantine Cycle Cover (BCC) for G is a (c, d) cycle cover C with the
following additional property: For every edge e 6= e′, there exists a cycle C ∈ C that covers e and does not
contain e′. In the distributed output format of a BCC algorithm, every node u knows a cycle Ce for each
of its incident edges e. In addition, it also knows an O˜(1)-bit identifier for each of these cycles.
We assume in this part, that the nodes have a linear estimate on the diameter of the graph.
The latter determines the duration of each compilation step. We note however that if the nodes
have a designated leader, than this assumption can be removed. That is, the assumption is needed
only for the purpose of electing a leader. Our main result in this context is the computation of
BCC in the presence of the Byzantine edge, i.e., removing the pre-processing assumption in the
compiler of [30].
4The two paths are not necessarily disjoint. The only requirement is that the last edge of one path does not appear
in the other one.
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Lemma 5. [BCC] Given that all nodes have a polynomial estimate on n = |V|, and a linear estimation of
the diameter D, For every 3-edge connected graph G of diameter D and fixed Byzantine edge e′, there exists
an r-round randomized algorithm that computes a (c, d) BCC w.r.t e′ with r = Ô(D2) and c, d = Ô(D).
As a result, we get a Byzantine compiler with a round overhead of Ô(D3) rounds. This
improves the round overhead by an Ô(D) factor, compared to the compilers of [30]. The latter,
however, handles a stronger adversary in which the identity of the Byzantine edge can alternate
in each round. We show:
Lemma 6. (Compiler for Byzantine edge) Given a 3–edge connected D–diameter graph G, and a (d, c)
BCC for G. Then any distributed algorithm A can be compiled into an equivalent algorithm A′ that is
resilient to a one fixed unknown Byzantine edge e′ while incurring an overhead of O(c · d2) in the number
of rounds.
Finally, we consider the Byzantine BFS problem defined as follows. Given a D–diameter, 3–
edge connected graph G and a source node s, it is required to either output a BFS tree rooted
at s, or alternatively output the identity of the Byzantine edge e′ and a BFS tree in G \ {e′}.
Note that this dual definition of the output format is necessary for the following reason. In case
where the Byzantine edge is honest for the entire BFS computation, one has no choice other
than outputting a BFS tree in G. In the remaining case in which the Byzantine edge played in a
dishonest manner, the algorithm would reveal its identity and build a reliable BFS tree in G \ {e′}.
Using the Byzantine Broadcast protocol as well as our BCC we show:
Lemma 7. [Byzantine BFS] Given that all nodes have a polynomial estimate on n = |V|, for every 3-edge
connected graph G = (V, E), and a source node s ∈ V, there exists a randomized algorithm that either
computes a BFS tree rooted at s, or else detects the Byzantine edge e′ and outputs a BFS tree roote at s in
G \ {e′}. The algorithm runs in Ô(D3) rounds.
Note that because the BFS problem has a leader by definition, there is no need to assume here
a bound on the diameter. In fact, if the adversary is oblivious to the randomness of the nodes,
using the message exchange scheme over the BCC presented in Lemma 44, we can reduce the
round complexity in Lemma 7 to Ô(D2).
Corollary 8. If the adversary of the Byzantine edge is oblivious to the randomness of the nodes, the
Byzantine BFS problem can be solved in Ô(D2) rounds with high probability.
We hope that our work will advance the study of round-efficient distributed graph algorithms
in the presence of Byzantine edges and nodes. While we set here the basic primitives for Byzan-
tine computation, many intriguing problems are left open. The most interesting open problem
concerns the complexity the Byzantine Broadcast problem. The current round complexity of
O˜(D2) might be explained by the fact that this is the existentially tight bound for the length of
two edge disjoint paths between pairs of nodes. We note that our main barrier for obtaining an
improved Broadcast algorithm is in solving the Collective Coin Flipping problem in which nodes
need to agree on a single random bit [5]. Beyond Broadcast, it will be interesting to devise
efficient Byzantine computation for many other classical graph problems, e.g., shortest paths,
MST, and minimum cut. While our general compiler provides a first-order solution for all these
problems, we believe the better bounds might be obtain by taking a white-box approach. Finally,
handling multiple Byzantine edges5 and nodes are yet another fundamental open ends.
5We believe that our framework can be only extended to provide bounds that are exponential in the number of
faults t, i.e., DO(t).
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1.2 Technical Overview
We start by highlighting concrete challenges in distributed computation that arise by a single
Byzantine edge e′ = (v1, v2).
1.2.1 Key Barriers with Handling a Byzantine Edge
The barriers can be roughly divided into two. The first type of complications comes from the fact
that the topology around the Byzantine edge is indistinguishable from that of a reliable one. The
second type of complications is due to the possible large congestion that might be formed by the
Byzantine edge.
Indistinguishability between Reliable and Non-Reliable Subgraphs. Dolev [12] showed that
the 3-edge connectivity of the graph is a necessary condition for guaranteeing the correctness
of the computation in the presence of a single Byzantine edge. A natural approach for solving
Broadcast is to send the desired message m0 along the three s-u edge-disjoint paths which are
guaranteed to exist for every u. As the Byzantine edge can appear on at most one of these paths,
the node u can infer the desired message by a simple majority rule. This approach has a few
caveats. First, it assumes the knowledge of three edge-disjoint paths between each node u and s.
Currently, even in the fault-free setting, there is no round efficient algorithm that computes these
paths. Secondly, even if these paths are known, their length might be as large as Ω(D3).
We next note that the Byzantine Broadcast task is involved already in the supposedly simpli-
fied case where the nodes are equipped with a spanning tree T ⊆ G of small depth in the graph
that is given in a distributed manner. One optional algorithm is to restrict each node to accept
messages only from its parent in the tree. This would be indeed a good approach in the restricted
𝑣2
𝑣1
𝑠
𝑇1 𝑇2
Figure 1: A challenging scenario for tree based com-
putations. Both trees T1 and T2 are reliable, but only
one of them holds the right message. Shown is a case
where only one of the subtrees of the Byzantine edge
is connected to the good subtree T1 that holds the
right message.
case where the Byzantine edge e′ = (v1, v2) is
not in T. When e′ ∈ T, there are two sub-
trees to consider, namely, T1 = T(s) \ T(v2)
and T2 = T(v2), obtained by omitting e′ from
T (Figure 1). The nodes of T1 hold the right
message m0, while the nodes of T2 hold a mes-
sage m1 6= m0. These trees are totally indistin-
guishable in the eyes of the nodes. To let the
nodes in T2 learn the right message, we must
use the cross-edges between T1 and T2, which
exist due to the edge connectivity of the graph.
Note, however, that these cross-edges might be
“badly” positioned. For example, it might be
the case that only one of the child sub-trees of v2 has cross-edges to the reliable tree T1. This
would imply that the path through the reliable cross-edges from a node in T1 to a node in T2
might be as long as Ω(n).
Congestion and Scheduling. Unless applying some filtering rules on the received messages, a
single Byzantine edge might create a large congestion in the graph that ultimately prevents the ar-
rival of the desired message m0 by some of the nodes within a fixed time bound. To illustrate this
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𝑒′𝑠
𝑢
X
𝑣1𝑣2
𝑤
Figure 2: Illustrating large congestion formed at
node u by the Byzantine edge.
idea, consider the toy example in Figure 2. The
node u, a neighbor of the two endpoints of the
Byzantine edge is connected to s by a path of
length `. The edge e′ might send u two dis-
tinct false messages from v1 and v2 on every
round. As a result, by the time that u receives
the message from s, it already has Ω(`) mes-
sages awaiting to be sent to w. Unless some filtering rule is applied, in any r-round algorithm
the Byzantine edge might create 2r false messages.
In the reliable setting, one of the most powerful tools for handling congestion is given by the
random delay approach [25, 19]. For a collection of k distributed algorithms, A1, . . . ,Ak, Ghaffari
[19] gave a scheduling scheme for running all these algorithms within O˜(congestion + dilation)
rounds, where dilation is the largest running time of the individual Ai algorithm, and congestion
is the largest number of messages sent by all algorithms via a single edge in the graph. One of the
major barriers for extending the random delay technique to the Byzantine setting is the follow-
ing. While the random delay approach holds with high probability, after fixing the randomness,
one can potentially design specific message patterns that create massive congestion in a given
round. Unfortunately, as the Byzantine edge knows the randomness of the algorithm, it might
deliberately design such bad patterns. For this reason, in our current algorithms, we usually use
the naı¨ve scheduling that implements all algorithms in O(congestion · dilation) rounds. Alterna-
tively, we show that if the Byzantine adversary is oblivious to the randomness of the algorithm,
one can indeed implement the Byzantine scheduling in O˜(congestion+ dilation) rounds.
1.3 Our Approach for Byzantine Broadcast in a Nutshell
Most existing Byzantine Broadcast algorithms are based on letting the nodes propagate their
received messages along with a full description of the paths on which these messages have been
received. Sending all the entire path information might lead to an inefficient round complexity
(presumably even exponential). Indeed, the knowledge of the paths along which the message
have been received is important to guarantee that each node u accepts the message only if it
received it through at least two edge disjoint paths. The efficiency of our Broadcast algorithm is
based on integrating together two key ideas that allow us to considerably reduce the exchanged
path information.
Idea 1: Broadcast via Weak Broadcast. We consider a weaker variant for the Broadcast problem,
in which it is required for each node u to output a set Mu that contains the Broadcast message
m0, plus possibly additional messages. It is then also required that the total number of false
messages in
⋃
u Mu is bounded by some constant. The Broadcast algorithm can be then viewed
as applying two steps of filtering. The first step, of applying the weak Broadcast, reduces the
number of candidate messages to O(1). Note that for this weaker requirement it is sufficient for
the graph to be only 2-edge connected rather than 3-edge connected. The second step examines
these candidate messages in a more refined manner by exploring the actual paths along which
these messages have been received. When a node u accepts a message mu as its final message, it
implicitly implies that u has received this message along two edge disjoint paths.
In the high-level, the weak Broadcast algorithm first lets the source s send the m0 message as
in a standard Broadcast algorithm. Clearly, some of the nodes might receive a message originated
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by the Byzantine edge rather than from the source s. During these O(D) rounds, each node u
defines its parent p(u) to be the neighbor from which it has received its first message. We show
that the union of edges
⋃
u{u, p(u)} \ {e′} defines a forest with at most three trees. One rooted
at s, and the other (potentially) two trees are rooted at the endpoints of the Byzantine edge v1
and v2. Our algorithm has two key steps. The first lets the nodes exchange information along
their cross-edges, namely, the non-tree edges. In the second, the information exchanged along
the cross-edges is propagated up to the root. The main novelty of our algorithm is in defining
a collection of priority rules for the messages sent over the trees. Specifically, the algorithm is
designed in a way that explicitly guarantees that the total number of false accepted messages in⋃
u Mu is constant. Our main efforts go into showing that despite this massive filtering, thanks
to our priory system, the correct message m0 is unmissed by none of the nodes. Finally, we note
that our weak Broadcast algorithm runs in optimal time of O(D) rounds, and unlike most of the
algorithms presented in this paper, it is also deterministic6.
Idea 2: Fault-Tolerant Sampling. The underlying objective in many of our algorithms is to ex-
change messages over reliable communication channels, free of the Byzantine edge e′. Towards
that goal, we employ a known sampling method, originally inspired by the color-coding tech-
nique of [1]. This method have been mostly applied in the context of fault tolerant spanners and
data structures [11, 40], and recently also for distributed cut computation [28]. The basic idea is to
oversample edges to act as a faulty-edge and compute the standard (non-fault tolerant) solution
on what remains. This allows us to satisfy pairs of vertices (e.g., having short paths between them
that avoid their forbidden edges) with a single iteration of the generic algorithm. This sampling
is then repeated for several iterations so that all pairs get satisfied with high probability.
In the very high level, our sampling based algorithms have several iterations where each
iteration i defines a random subgraph Gi that includes each edge in G independently with prob-
ability p = (1− 1/D). The key observation is that since the graph is 3-edge connected, for every
node u there is an s-u path in G \ {e′} of length O(D). The iteration i is then said to be good
for the node u if two events occur simultaneously: (i) the entire s-u shortest path in G \ {e′} is
in Gi and (ii) the Byzantine edge e′ is not in Gi. It is easy to see that the probability that Gi is
good is Ω(1/D). Intuitively, in good iterations, the node u can successfully receive the message
m0 from s. Repeating this procedure for O(D log n) iterations guarantees the existence of at least
one good iteration for every node.
Note that in the Byzantine setting, already the implementation of the edge sampling (i.e.,
which defines the Gi subgraph) is nontrivial. How can the endpoints of an edge (u, v) sample
their edge in a consistent manner? This is unclear as the Byzantine edge e′ might always lie to
its endpoints, leading to a situation in which it mistakenly participates in all the Gi subgraphs.
One option to mitigate this challenge is by reducing the sampling probability. This, however, in
our setting, leads to an extra D factor in the running time of the algorithms. We therefore handle
this by two different approaches. In the context of the Broadcast algorithm, we show that the
sampling can be applied in a directional manner, i.e., each node only sample the set of its incoming
neighbors on which it receive messages7. For the purpose of computing the Byzantine cycle
covers, as will be explained next, we dramatically reduce the amount of randomness required for
6Using the derandomization tools for sampling of [28] we can modify the presented algorithms to be deterministic
while paying a factor of O(D) in the round complexity.
7For the Broadcast algorithm the notion of a good iteration is defined in a more refined manner, which actually
allows the participation of the Byzantine edge.
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this procedure which allows us to efficiently implement the sampling in the Byzantine setting
without any loss in the round complexity.
1.4 Byzantine Cycle Covers and Compilers
The construction of the Byzantine cycle cover is also based on the fault tolerant sampling ap-
proach. We will be using the Byzantine Broadcast and Leader Election algorithms of Theorem 2
and Lemma 3. The high level idea is to apply the distributed cycle cover algorithm A of [31]
(which works in the standard reliable setting) on the sampled subgraphs Gi obtained by fault tol-
erant sampling technique. More specifically, the algorithm has ` = O˜(D) iterations i ∈ {1, . . . , `}
in which it defines a sampled subgraph Gi and applies the cycle cover algorithm on Gi. By setting
the sampling probability to 1− 1/D, w.h.p., each edge e has an iteration in which e′ is not sam-
pled into Gi, but a short cycle covering e in G \ {e′} is sampled to Gi. As a result, the algorithm
A will cover e by a short cycle that is free from e′. The algorithm itself is more involved since
the definition of Byzantine cycle cover also requires to cover the Byzantine edge e′. In addition,
the output of the Byzantine cycle cover algorithm should contain only legal cycles. These two
restrictions pose some technical barriers as the Byzantine edge is sampled in most of the itera-
tions, and it is hard to obtain any guarantee on the computed cycles in those iterations. E.g., the
computed cycles in the presence of this edge might be corrupted in various manners, and suffer
from large congestion. We handle this by designing a verification procedure that inspects the
validity of the output cycles after each iteration. We next highlight the key new ideas needed for
the computation of the Byzantine cycle covers, and the final compilation.
Step (I): derandomization of the sampling procedure. We provide a new derandomization
scheme for the fault tolerant sampling technique that can implement the sampling using a short
seed of just O˜(1) bits. By using our Byzantine Leader Election and Broadcast algorithms, this
seed can be sent to all nodes in O˜(D2) rounds. The derandomization is based on two key steps.
We first show that each iteration of the sampling procedure can be implemented with a seed of
length O(log n · (log log n)3). This is based on noting that the desired events of a good iteration
can be expressed as a read-once CNF formula. We follow the approach of Parter and Yogev
in [29], and use the PRGs by Gopalan [20] that provides short seed which can fool these CNF
formulas. Since our algorithm applies O˜(D) iterations, the PRG tool reduces the seed to O˜(D)
bits. In the second step, we reduce the seed length even further by noting that it is sufficient for
the sampling events of different iterations to be only O(log n)-wise independent. By using known
hash families for bounded independence and combine it with the PRG scheme of Gopalan [20],
the seed length is reduced to O˜(1) bits.
Using this shared seed, every node u can decide in a given iteration i which of its incident
edges belong to Gi. Importantly, this decision is consistent between the two edge endpoints,
without any direct communication. As the fault tolerant sampling technique has a wide range
of algorithmic applications, we believe that this derandomization technique might be of inde-
pendent interest. Finally note that recently [28] also designed a deterministic algorithm for the
sampling technique that is based on independent tools. The derandomization of [28] looses a
factor of O(D) in the running time, and therefore we did not implement it in the current setting.
Our derandomization, on the other hand, reduces the length of the random seed to O˜(1) bits
without any loss in the efficiency.
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Step (ii) BCC computation given a short seed. At this point all nodes share a small seed which
defines the desired sampled subgraphs G1, . . . , G` in each iteration i = 1, . . . , ` of the algorithm.
Note, however, that as most of these sampled subgraphs contain the Byzantine edge, the output
of the cycle cover algorithm A might be invalid in those iterations. We therefore design a cycle
verification procedure, applied after each application of the cycle cover algorithm. This verification
procedure allows all node to eliminate bogus cycles (e.g.,long cycles, partial cycles or cycles
with a large overlap). Another barrier that one has to overcome concerns the covering of the
Byzantine edge e′ itself. Since our success guarantee is based on iterations i for which e′ /∈ Gi,
it is a-priori unclear how to cover the edge e′ = (v1, v2). Note that covering this edge is crucial
for our compiler, as the original algorithm which we compile might indeed exchange messages
between v1 and v2. We handle this challenge by showing that thanks ot our cycle verification
procedure, at the end, there might be at most one uncovered edge, and moreover, this edge must
be the Byzantine edge. To cover this last edge, we simply compute a short v1-v2 path in the graph
G \ {e′}.
Step (iii): Compilation. The compiler simulates each round of a given distributed algorithm A
in a round by round manner. Each round is simulated by exchanging messages along the cycles
of the Byzantine cycle cover. Interestingly, unlike [30], we use the special properties of the BCC
to deduce the original messages without requiring each edge to be covered by two-edge disjoint
cycles. This more refined scheme leads to an Ô(D)-factor of improvement in the overhead of our
compiler, compared to that of [30]. In the high level, upon exchanging the messages between
u and v on their cycles, every node v decides the identity of the correct message from u, in the
following manner. In case where all the messages received from u through the cycles covering
(u, v) are the same, the node v considers this message as the correct one. Otherwise, it believes
to the message received through the direct (u, v) edge. The correctness follows immediately by
noting that the BCC algorithm covers edge (u, v) by at least one reliable cycle.
Preliminaries. For a graph G = (V, E), a subgraph G′ and nodes u, v ∈ V(G′), let pi(u, v, G′) be
the unique u-v shortest path in G′ where shortest-path ties are decided in a consistent manner. Let
N(u, G) be the neighbors of node u in the graph G. When the graph G is clear from the context
we may omit it and write N(u). For a path P = [u1, . . . , uk] and an edge e = (uk, v), let P ◦ e
denote the path obtained by concatenating e to P. In the round complexity computation of the
different algorithms, the term O˜(·) hides poly-logarithmic factors in the number of nodes n, and
the term Ô(·) hides a factor of 2O(
√
log n). In all presented algorithms we assume simultaneous
wake-up. We note that the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm can easily be modified in order to
operate correctly without this assumption.
2 Byzantine Broadcast
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. In order to solve the Broadcast problem, we take a two
step approach. First, we apply a weak Broadcast procedure that roughly speaking computes for
each node v a small set of candidate messages Mv. The set Mv is guaranteed to contain m0, but
potentially, include few other messages m′ 6= m0. At this point, the nodes cannot tell which of
the messages in Mv is the correct one. In the second step, we apply the key part of the Byzantine
Broadcast procedure which allows each node to detect the right message m0.
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Throughout our algorithm description, we assume that the nodes have an estimate c · D on
the diameter D of the graph, for some constant c > 1. Then, in Section 2.3, we show how this
assumption can be removed.
2.1 Weak Broadcast with a Byzantine Edge
We begin with providing an algorithm for a weaker variant of the problem where we allow
each vertex to receive additional constant number of false messages. In this section we prove of
Theorem 1.
Definition 9 (Weak Broadcast). In the weak Broadcast problem, given is a two-edge connected graph
G = (V, E) and a designated vertex s holding an initial message m0. The goal is for all nodes in the
network to receive a copy of m∗, and potentially a few other messages. In the output format of the problem,
each node v holds at the end of the algorithm a set of messages Mv, that satisfies the following: (i) m0 ∈ Mv
for every v, and (ii) |⋃v∈V Mv| = O(1).
Note that for the purpose of the weak Broadcast, it is sufficient for the graph to be only two-
edge connected. It is only in the Broadcast algorithm that we need the graph to be three-edge
connected. We begin with presenting the algorithm, and then analyze its correctness. As we will
see, the algorithm is designed in a way that forces property (ii) to hold by restricting the number
of distinct messages received over a given edge. The key challenge will be to show that this
restriction does not prevent the nodes from receiving the correct message m0.
2.1.1 The Weak Broadcast Algorithm
The algorithm consists of four steps to be repeated twice. After the first repetition, each node
v will have a set M1,v of at most three messages. After the second repetition, it will have an
additional set M2,v with at most two additional messages. The final output Mv will be the union
of these two sets. The guarantee would be that m0 ∈ Mv and |⋃v Mv| = O(1). Each of the
four steps consists of at most 5D rounds. Throughout the algorithm if a node receives an illegal
message, or a message that is different than the messages expected in the current step, it is
ignored.
Step 1: Partial Broadcast, Learning Parents and Children. The phase starts by letting s send
its message m0 to all its neighbors. In every subsequent round, any node u upon receiving the
first message, say m′, from a neighbor v does the following: (1) sets mu = m′, (2) defines v as its
parent p(u) and (3) sends an acknowledgment message to its parent v in the next round. The
latter allows v to learn its children (at least in the reliable setting). In addition to the message
propagation, the nodes also send in this step the path information along which this message has
been received.
To be able to send this path information in a pipeline manner, the edges of the paths are
sent in a reversed order. That is, in the next round after receiving mu, the node u sends the
message mu to all its neighbors along with the last edge on this path (p(u), u). To prevent the
Byzantine edge from sending additional faulty messages during the rounds in which the path
information is being sent, every node u upon receiving its first message in round tu, treats all
additional messages arriving from p(u) in the subsequent rounds tu + 1, . . . , tu + 2D as messages
that specify the edges of the path Pu. Any other message sent by a neighbor v′ 6= p(u), will
be ignored by u. At the end of the first phase , every node u holds a message mu, a path Pu, a
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parent p(u), and a list of its children Ch(u). Observe that the information Ch(u) and Pu might
be corrupted.
Step 2: Exchanging Messages on Cross-Edges. Using the child set Ch(u), the node u defines
the cross-edges to be the edges (u, v) satisfying v 6= p(u) and v /∈ Ch(u). Let N′(u) = {v ∈
N(u) | v /∈ Ch(u) ∪ {p(u)}} be the neighbors of u on its cross-edges. Note that the Byzantine
edge e′ might be mistakenly defined as a cross-edge by one of its endpoints, or mistakenly not
treated as one.
Next, the endpoints of every cross-edge (u, v) exchange the O(D)-bit messages (mu, Pu) and
(mv, Pv). This can be done in O(D) rounds. Any message received on a non-cross edge is ignored.
Each node u will keep two sets of information, M′u and Lu based on the messages received from
the set of its cross-edge neighbors N′(u). The set M′u = {mv | mv 6= mu, v ∈ N′(u)} simply
contains all the messages that are distinct from mu. Lu is the set of nodes
Lu = {L(u, v) | L(u, v) = L(v, u) and mv = mu, v ∈ N′(u)} ,
where L(u, v) is defined as the closest node to u in Pu ∩ Pv on the path Pu. Since the nodes u, v
exchange the paths Pu, Pv, the node u can locally compute both L(u, v) and L(v, u) and therefore
also the set Lu.
Step 3: Upcast. The goal of this step is to upcast the different messages received in Step 2 over
the edges F =
⋃
u{(u, p(u))}. This will also allows each node u to compute an estimate `u for the
upmost node in Pu that received mu.
Step 3 works from the leaf nodes up to the root. Specifically, a node u is considered to be a
leaf if Ch(u) = ∅. Let Vi = {u | |Pu| = i}. The third step has 2D phases. In phase i, every
node u ∈ V2D−i sends its parent p(u) a message of the following format 〈`u, m1, m2〉 where `u
is a node on Pu that is carefully computed, and m1, m2 6= mu are messages selected from the set
of messages that u received so-far (i.e., from its children and cross-edges). The content of this
message is computed by u in the following manner. Let m(v, u) = 〈`v, mv,1, mv,2〉 be the message
u received from v in phase i− 1. Define
L′u = {`v | ∃v ∈ Ch(u), m(v, u) = 〈`v, mv,1, mv,2〉, `v ∈ Pu and v /∈ Pu[u, `v]}8.
The node `u is then defined as the far-most node from u on the path Pu that belongs to the set
L′u ∪ Lu. In the case where L′u ∪ Lu = ∅, let `u = u. Intuitively, `u provides an indication for the
up-most node w on Pu such that mw = mu. The additional messages m1, m2 are defined based on
the following priority: (I1) messages of M′u, i.e., that were received in Step 2 via a cross-edge; (I2)
a single message received by two different children (I3) a pair of distinct messages, each received
by a distinct child; (I4) all messages u received in Steps 2,3 in the case where u received at most
two additional messages distinct from mu. In the case where u received at most one additional
message, it might be that m2 and perhaps also m1 are empty.
8The event where v ∈ Pu[`v, u] indicates a corrupted situation and threfore should be ommited in the calculation
of L′u.
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Step 4: Downcast and Acceptance. The final step propagates messages from the root down to
the leaf nodes. It will again have 2D phases, where in phase i each node u ∈ Vi has to make a
decision regarding which messages to include in the set M1,u. It will then send its children all
the messages in M1,u \ {mu}. The set M1,u contains the message mu plus at most two additional
messages that are selected based on the following priority:
• (I5) a message m′ 6= mu received from two different neighbors in Steps 2,3. Including the
messages received from cross-edges and children.
• (I6) a message m′ received from a single child and `u = u. If more than two messages meet
this condition, u prefers to include in M1,u two messages from two different children.
• (I7) a message m′ received from its parent and `u 6= u.
• (I8) In case u received at most two distinct messages m1, m2 6= mu in Steps 2-4, u adds
m1, m2 to M1,u.
In the analysis, we show that the total number of different messages over all nodes in the graph
is bounded by a constant.
A Slight Modification for the Second Repetition. In the second repetition of Steps 2 to 4, we
apply the following small adaptations. In Step 2, each node u sends the messages M1,u \ {mu}
over all its cross-edges. In particular, at this point there is no need to send the path information
and the algorithm will use the same `u values computed in the first application. Then, in Step 4,
the nodes add the messages to the set M2,u rather than M1,u. The final output set Mu is the union
of M1,u and M2,u.
2.1.2 Analysis
We next prove the correctness of the algorithm. Denote the Byzantine edge by e′ = (v1, v2),
and let m0 be the message the source node s sent during the first step. Since the graph is 3–edge
connected, after at most 2D rounds every node v receives a message m′ and defines the values mv
and p(v). We begin by bounding the number of false messages sent throughout the algorithm.
Claim 10. The total number of different messages m′ sent throughout the algorithm is at most 10.
Proof. Every message m′ 6= m0 sent throughout the algorithm is originated at the Byzantine edge
e′ and thus it is sent through either v1 or v2. Therefore, it is sufficient to bound the number of
false messages m′ 6= m0 the Byzantine edge sends (and which are not ignored).
During the first step, because each vertex stores and forwards only one message, e′ might
create at most two false messages, one at v1, and one at v2. In addition, at the end of Step 1 the
nodes v1 and v2 either considers e′ as a cross-edge, an edge to a parent or an edge connected
to a child. From now on, the role of the edge e′ in the eyes of v1 and v2 is fixed throughout
both applications of Steps 2-4. In the first application, the number of distinct messages a node
receives through a cross-edge is one and the number of distinct messages a node receives over
an edge connected to a child or a parent is bounded by two. If v1 or v2 receives more than two
different messages through e′, the number of messages is different than the expected number
in that step and therefore the messages are ignored. Regarding the second application, for a
node v the set M1,v consists of mv and at most two additional messages, therefore the number of
different messages sent through an edge (that are not ignored) is also bounded by two. Hence,
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we conclude that during both applications of Steps 2-4, e′ can send at most 4 different messages
to each endpoint. Thus, together with the first step the total number of false messages sent
throughout the algorithm, that are not ignored, is bounded by 10.
We are left to show that for every node v ∈ V it holds that m0 ∈ Mv. Consider the set of
edges {(v, p(v)) | v ∈ V} defined in the first step. We note that when omitting the Byzantine
edge e′, these set of edges form a forest with at most three trees.
Observation 11. Let E′ = {(v, p(v)) : v ∈ V} \ {e′}. Then F = (V, E′) is a forest with at most three
trees rooted at either s, v1 or v2.
Proof. Since all edges in E \ {e′} are reliable, every message a vertex v received and stored in the
first step origins either at s, v1 or v2. Due to the definition of the first step and the fact that each
vertex defines a single parent, all nodes that received a message that origins at s together with
the edges in E′ forms a tree. Similarly, the vertices that received a message that origins at vi,
i ∈ {1, 2} together with E′ forms a tree as well.
Next we divide the analysis into three cases depending of the topology of F = (V, E′).
𝑠
𝑣1 𝑣2
𝑒′
A single tree T two trees when 𝑣1 ∈ 𝑇2two trees when 𝑣1 ∈ 𝑇1
𝑠
𝑣1
𝑒′
𝑇1 𝑇2
𝑣2
𝑣2
𝑣1
𝑇2𝑇1
a b2b1
Figure 3: Left: F has a single tree rooted at the source node s. Right: F has two trees.
Case 1: F = (V, E′) is Connected. Since e′ /∈ E′, and F is a tree we have that both edges
(v1, p(v1)) and (v2, p(v2)) differ from e′. For an illustration see Figure 3(a). We therefore have
that neither v1 nor v2 stores a message sent through the Byzantine edge in the first step. Hence,
we conclude that mu = m0 for every u ∈ V. Recall that mu ∈ M1,u ⊆ Mu and the claim follows.
Case 2: F = (V, E′) Has Two Trees T1 and T2. Let T1 be the tree rooted at s and w.l.o.g assume
that the tree T2 is rooted at v2. Thus, we can conclude that p(v2) = v1 where v1 is either in T1
or T2, see Figure 3(b). If during Step 1 every node v ∈ V sets mv = m0, then according to Step
4 m0 ∈ M1,v ⊆ Mv. Otherwise, v2 received a message m1 6= m0 over the edge e′ during the first
step. Since all edges in E′ are reliable, we conclude that all vertices in T2 also received and stored
m1 in Step 1. We first claim that v2 receives the message m0 during Steps 2 and 3.
Claim 12. v2 receives m0 either through a cross-edge in Step 2 or from at least one child is Step 3.
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Proof of Claim 12. First note that since G is 3–edge connected, there exists a node u ∈ V(T2) that
received m0 in Step 2 over a cross-edge. If v2 receives m0 over a cross-edge in Step 2, m0 ∈ M′(v2)
and the claim follows. Otherwise, we consider the following two cases.
• Assume v1 ∈ T1 (Figure 3(b1)). Because p(v2) = v1 and v1 /∈ T2, for every u ∈ V(T2) its
cross-edges to N′(u) as well its edges to its children Ch(u) are reliable. Hence, we conclude
that the only messages sent to u ∈ V(T2) in Steps 2,3 are m0 and m1. Therefore because the
edges of the tree T2 are reliable, the root v2 receives the message m0 in Step 3 from a node
w ∈ Ch(v2) due to priority (I4).
• Assume v1 ∈ T2 (Figure 3(b2)). In case v1 considers e′ = (v1, v2) as a cross-edge, v1 can
receive in Step 2 at most one false message m2. Hence, the only messages received by
vertices in V(T2) in Step 2 are m0 and m2. Since all tree edges in T2 are reliable, we conclude
that v2 receives the message m0 in Step 3 due to priority (I4).
Next we assume that v1 views the node v2 as a child i.e. v2 ∈ Ch(v1). During Step 3, v1 can
receive at most two false messages m2, m3 over the edge e′ (other messages will be ignored).
Consider the T2-path from v1 to the root v2 denoted by pi(v1, v2, T2). Note that in Step 3 the
false messages m2 and m3 can be sent only over the edges of the path pi(v1, v2, T2). Hence
the messages m2 and m3 does not meet priorities (I1) and (I2). In case v2 receives m0 from
a child u /∈ pi(v1, v2, T2) due to priority (I3) the claim follows.
For the remaining case where v2 did not receive m0 from a child u /∈ pi(v1, v2, T2), we show
that there exists a vertex w ∈ pi(v1, v2, T2) that sends p(w) the message m0 in Step 3 and
therefore v2 receives m0 over the path pi(v1, v2, T2), see Figure 4. Let w ∈ pi(v1, v2, T2) be
the closest vertex to v1 with a vertex u ∈ T(w) such that m0 ∈ M′u, where T(w) is the
sub-tree rooted at w. In particular, u is a node in T2 with a cross-edge to T1. Note that
because T2 is connected to T1 via a reliable cross-edge, there exists such a vertex w. Since
all edges except e′ are reliable, and w is chosen to be the closest such vertex to v1, we can
conclude that w received the message m0 from a neighbor u′ /∈ pi(v1, v2, T2) (see Figure 4).
Hence, by priorities (I1,I2) w sends m0 to p(w) ∈ pi(v1, v2, T2) in the third step. Since the
false messages m2, m3 can be sent from v only through the reliable path pi(v1, v2, T2), we
conclude that v2 will receive m0 through the path pi(v1, v2, T2) is Step 3.
𝑠
𝑣1
𝑒′
𝑇1 𝑇2
𝑣2
𝑤
𝑢
Figure 4: Illustration of the case where v2 ∈ Ch(v1) in the proof of Claim 12.
Before we show that every u ∈ V(T2) adds m0 to M1,u in Step 4, we prove the following
auxiliary claim.
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Claim 13. At the end of Step 3 it holds that `v2 = v2.
Proof of Claim 13. First recall that ∀u ∈ V(T2) it holds that mu = m1 and ∀u /∈ V(T2), mu = m0. We
next claim that for every node u ∈ V(T2) the set Lu ⊆ pi(v2, u, T2). For every reliable cross-edge
between u ∈ V(T2) and a neighbor w ∈ N′(u) such that mw = m1, it hold that w ∈ V(T2). Hence,
by definition L(u, w) = L(w, u) ∈ pi(v2, u, T2). In case where v1 ∈ V(T2) and v1 considers the
edge e′ = (v1, v2) as a cross-edge, since v2 ∈ Pv2 ∩ Pv1 either L(v1, v2) = v2 or L(v1, v2) 6= L(v2, v1)
and therefore L(v1, v2) /∈ Lv1 .
We now also show that L′u ⊆ pi(v2, u, T2) for every u ∈ V(T2). In case where either v1 /∈ V(T2)
or v2 /∈ Ch(v1), all edges between a node u ∈ V(T2) to a child w ∈ Ch(u) are reliable. Hence,
because ∀w ∈ V(T2),Lw ⊆ pi(v2, w, T2) we conclude that L′u ⊆ pi(v2, u, T2) as well. In case
v1 ∈ V(T2) and v2 ∈ Ch(v1), let 〈`v2 , mv2,1, mv2,2〉 be the faulty message v1 received over the edge
e′. If the node `v2 that was sent through the edge e′ is not in Pv1 , the message is illegal and v1
ignores it. Otherwise, if `v2 /∈ pi(v2, v1, T2), then v2 ∈ Pv1 [v1, `v2 ] and by the definition of L′v1 ,
`v2 /∈ L′v1 . Hence we conclude that L′v1 ⊆ pi(v2, v1, T2). Since all other edges are reliable, for every
u ∈ V(T2) it holds that L′u ⊆ pi(v2, u, T2) in this case as well.
As for v2, note that because p(v2) = v1 all its cross-edges and edges to its children Ch(v2) are
reliable. Because every vertex u with mu = m1 is in the tree T2, it holds that Lv2 = ∅. In addition,
for u ∈ Ch(v2) since Lu ∪ L′u ⊆ pi(v2, u, T2), either `u = v2 or `u = u. If `u = u and u /∈ Pv2 it
is ignored. In case `u = u and u ∈ Pv2 , then u ∈ Pv2 [v2, `u] and therefore it is ignored as well.
Hence, we conclude that Lv2 ⊆ {v2} and `v2 = v2.
We next show that every u ∈ V(T2) adds m0 to M1,u in Step 4 of the first application. Since
M1,u ⊆ Mu, this completes the proof of Case 2.
Claim 14. For every u ∈ V(T2) it holds that m0 ∈ M1,u.
Proof of Claim 14. We first claim that for every node u ∈ V(T2) and a message m′ 6= m0 received
in Step 2 or Step 3, m′ was received from a single neighbor and therefore does not meet the
condition of priority (I5). Moreover, we will see that all false messages m′ 6= m0 received by u in
Steps 2,3 where received from the same node. For u ∈ V(T2) consider a false message m′ 6= m0
received by u in Steps 2,3 either over a cross-edge or from a child. Hence, m′ was sent over the
edge e′ = (v1, v2) to v1 (either in Step 2 or Step 3) and then v1 upcast m′ to u over the path
pi(v1, u, T2). Therefore all the false messages received at u in Steps 2,3 are received through the
same path.
Next we prove the claim by induction on the distance i from the root v2. For the base of
the induction i = 0, if v2 received m0 from two different neighbors, by priority (I5) m0 ∈ M1,v2 .
Otherwise, by Claim 12 v2 receives m0 is Step 3. In addition, by Claim 13 it holds that v2 = `v2 .
Since all false messages are received from a single neighbor, due to priority (I6) m0 ∈ M1,v2 .
Assume the claim holds for all vertices in V(T2) at distance i from v2 and consider a node
v ∈ V(T2) at distance i + 1 from v2. By the induction assumption for the node p(v) it holds
that m0 ∈ M1,p(v), and therefore v receives m0 from p(v) in Step 4. If v receives m0 from two
neighbors w1, w2 6= p(v), by priority (I5) m0 ∈ M1,v (recall that all false messages does not meet
this condition).
We next show that if v did not receive m0 in Steps 2,3 `v 6= v. Hence, in this case no false
message will meet the condition of priority (I6), and due to priority (I7) v will add m0 to M1,v.
Since the graph is 3–edge connected, there exists a vertex w in the sub-tree rooted at v denoted as
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T(v) with a reliable cross-edge connected to a vertex w1 /∈ V(Tv). If w1 ∈ V(T1) then w receives
m0 in Step 2, and due to priority (I1) w also sent m0 to p(w). Since all messages m′ 6= m0 received
by any node u ∈ V(T2) in Step 3 are received through the same path pi(v1, u, T2), they do not
meet the condition of priority (I2). Hence due to priorities (I3,I4) v should have received m0 from
a neighbor in Ch(v). We conclude that w1 ∈ V(T2) \V(T(v)) and L(w1, w) ∈ Pv[p(v), v2]. Thus,
`w ∈ Pv[p(v), v2] and since w ∈ T(v) and all edges in T(v) are reliable, `v 6= v.
We are left to show that in case v received m0 in Steps 2,3 from a single vertex, v will also
add m0 to M1,v. If `v = v, because all false messages are received from the same single neighbor, v
will add m0 to M1,v by priority (I6). Otherwise, `v 6= v and due to priority (I7) and the induction
assumption, m0 ∈ M1,v in this case as well.
𝑠
𝑣1
𝑒′
𝑇0 𝑇1
𝑣2
𝑇2
Figure 5: Illustration of case 3 where F = (E′, V) has three trees.
Case 3: F = (V, E′) Has Three Trees T0, T1 and T2. Let T0 be the tree rooted at s and let Ti be
the tree rooted at vi for i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, v1 and v2 received the messages mv1 , mv2 through the
edge e′ and therefore v1 = p(v2), v2 = p(v1). See Figure 5 for an illustration. First note that for
every node u ∈ V(T0) in holds that mu = m0 and therefore m0 ∈ M1,u. As for T1 and T2, for every
node u ∈ V(Ti) the message mu origins at the root vi. Denote the message mv1 by m1 and mv2 by
m2. We observe that since p(v1) = v2 and p(v2) = v1 no vertex v ∈ V considers e′ as neither a
cross-edge nor an edge to a child in Ch(v) (see Figure 5). Hence, all cross-edges as well as edges
from a node w to a node u ∈ Ch(w) are reliable.
Observation 15. For every w ∈ V all edges between w and a node u ∈ Ch(w) as well as the cross-edges
between w and a node u ∈ N′(w) are reliable.
We begin with the following auxiliary claim.
Claim 16. For i ∈ {1, 2} if mi 6= m0, then `(vi) = vi.
Proof of Claim 16. Without loss of generality assume i = 1. We will show that for every v ∈ V(T1)
with a cross-edge to a node w ∈ N′(v) such that mv = mw = m1 either L(u, w) 6= L(w, u) or
L(u, w) = L(w, u) ∈ pi(v1, v, T1). By Observation 15, we could then deduce that ∀v ∈ V(T1)
it holds that Lv ∪ L′v ⊆ pi(v1, v, T1) and therefore `v1 = v1. Let v ∈ V(T1) be a node with a
cross-edge to w ∈ N′(v) such that mv = mw = m1. Since m1 6= m0 and the cross-edge (v, w)
is reliable, either w ∈ V(T1) or w ∈ T(V2). If w ∈ V(T1) because all tree edges in T1 are
reliable, L(u, w) = L(w, u) ∈ pi(v1, v, T1). In case w ∈ V(T2) and mw = m2 = m1, it holds
that Pw[w, v2] ∩ Pu[u, v1] = ∅. In addition, since v1 = p(v2) and v2 = p(v1) we conclude that
L(u, w) = v1 while L(w, u) = v2.
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For every i ∈ {1, 2} we show that if there exists a node u1 ∈ V(Ti) with a cross-edge to a
node u2 ∈ V(T0), for every node u ∈ V(T1), the message m0 is added to M1,u during the first
application of Step 4.
Claim 17. If there exists a vertex w ∈ V(Ti) with a cross-edge to a neighbor w′ ∈ V(T0), then ∀u ∈
V(Ti) it holds that m0 ∈ M1,u. Moreover, M1,u = M1,vi for every u ∈ V(Ti).
Proof of Claim 17. Without loss of generality assume i = 1. We begin with showing that m0 is in
M1,v1 . We also show that if there exists a cross-edge between V(T1) and V(T2) and m1 6= m2 then
m2 ∈ M1,v1 . By Observation 15, it holds that for every node u ∈ V(T1) the only messages u can
receive during Steps 2,3 are m0 and m2. Moreover, since there exists a vertex w ∈ V(T1) with a
cross-edge to a neighbor in V(T0), v1 receives m0 by the end of Step 3. If there exists a cross-edge
between V(T1) and V(T2) then v1 also receives m2 in the same manner. Due to Claim 16, `v1 = v1
and by priorities (I5,I6) we conclude that m0 ∈ M1,v1 . If V(T1) and V(T2) are connected via a
cross-edge, it also holds that m2 ∈ M1,v1 in the same manner.
We next show by induction on the distance i from v1 that ∀u ∈ V(T1) it holds that M1,u =
M1,v1 . For u = v1 the claim holds trivially. Assume the claim holds for all vertices at distance i
and consider a vertex v ∈ V(T1) at distance i + 1 from v1. Due to observation 15 all cross-edges
as well as edges from vertices in V(T1) to their children are reliable. Therefore the only messages
u can receive during Steps 2,3 are m0 and m2. Recall that if there exists any vertex w ∈ V(T1)
which received m2 then m2 ∈ M1,v1 . Thus, it holds that M1,v ⊆ M1,v1 .
We now show that M1,v1 ⊆ M1,v. Since p(v) is at distance i from v1, by the induction assump-
tion v receives M1,v1 \ {m1} from p(v) in Step 4. Since any message m′ 6= m1 that v received
in Steps 2,3 is contained in M1,v1 \ {m1}, because |M1,v1 \ {m1}| ≤ 2 by priority (I8) v adds the
messages M1,v1 \ {m1} to M1,v. Hence, it holds that M1,v ⊆ M1,v1 .
Since G is 3-edge connected, at least one of the trees T1, T2 contains a vertex u with a cross-
edge to w ∈ V(T0). If both trees contains such vertices, by Claim 17 for every v ∈ V m0 ∈ M1,v ⊆
Mv. Otherwise, without loss of generality assume V(T1) has a cross-edge to V(T0). It remains to
consider the remaining case where T2 has a cross-edge to T1. Since the graph is 3-edge connected,
there must exist at least one such edge. In case m1 = m0, using the same argument as Claim 17
every node u ∈ V(T2) adds m0 to M1,u during the first application. Thus, assume m1 6= m0. In
order to complete the proof of Theorem 1 we will show that ∀u ∈ V(T2) , by the end of the
second application of Step 4 m0 ∈ M2,u.
Claim 18. For every vertex v ∈ V(T2) it holds that m0 ∈ M2,u.
Proof. Due to the connectivity of G, there exists a vertex v ∈ V(T2) with a cross-edge to a neighbor
w ∈ V(T1). We begin with showing that for the root v2 it holds that m0 ∈ M2,v2 . By Claim 17
at the end of the first application m0 ∈ M1,v for every v ∈ V(T1). Moreover, M1,v = M1,v1 for all
v ∈ V(T1). Denote by M = M1,v1 \ {m1}. Recall that by the definition of the algorithm |M| ≤ 2
and because m1 6= m0 it holds that m0 ∈ M.
Since no vertex in V(T2) has a cross-edge to V(T0) and all cross-edges are reliable, we con-
clude that the only messages received by vertices in V(T2) in Step 2 of the second application are
in M. By Observation 15, all edges participating in Step 3 are reliable and therefore we conclude
that v2 receives all the messages in M by the end of Step 3 and no additional message. Due to
Claim 16, it holds that `v2 = v2 and therefore by priorities (I5,I6) m0 ∈ M ⊆ M2,v2 .
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We next show by induction on the distance i from v2 that ∀u ∈ V(T2) it holds that M ⊆ M2,u.
Assume the claim holds for all vertices at distance i and consider a vertex u ∈ V(T2) at distance
i + 1 from v2. Since p(u) is at distance i from v1 by the induction assumption u receives M from
p(u) in Step 4. Note that since all cross-edges and edges connecting a vertex to its children are
reliable (Observation 15), any message m′ that v received in Steps 2 and 3 is in the set M. Because
p(v) sent v in Step 4 at most two distinct messages, by priority (I8) v adds the messages in M to
M2,v in Step 4.
2.2 The Byzantine Broadcast Algorithm
We are now ready to present the complete description of the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm, and
prove Theorem 2. We note that our algorithm shares some similarities with the algorithm of
[26] which handles the more involved setting of asynchronous networks with Byzantine nodes.
While the algorithm of [26] uses polynomially large messages, our algorithm is adapted to the
CONGEST model and has a considerably improved round complexity. The basic idea would be
to keep track of the paths along which the messages have been received and to accept a message
only when it is received from two different paths. By different we mean that a node u received
the message over a path P, and in addition from a neighbor w such that the edge (u, w) is not
contained in P.
Step 0: Weak Broadcast. The algorithm starts by applying the weak Broadcast algorithm of
Theorem 1 with the source s and the message m0. As a result, each node u holds a message set
Mu containing m0, and the total number of messages kept in the network is |⋃u Mu| = O(1).
From now on, if a node u ∈ V receives a message m′ /∈ Mu it is simply ignored. To decide which
of the messages in Mu is the correct one, the algorithm proceeds with two phases. The first phase
has O(D2 log n) rounds and the second phase has O(D) rounds. Throughout these phases the
nodes exchange two types of messages:
• Heard Bundles: A bundle of heard messages sent from node v to u consists of (i) a header
message heard(m, len, P), where P is a path of length len along which v received the message
m; and (ii) len messages specifying the edges of P, one by one. Overall, this bundle contains
len + 1 messages that will be sent in a pipeline manner in the following way. The first
message is the header heard(m, len, P) sent in round τ, and then in the next consecutive len
rounds, v sends the edges of P in a reverse order (from the edge incident to v to s).
• Accept Messages: A message accept(m) received on the edge (u, v) indicates to v that u
has decided to accept the message m as the output message.
Clearly, the messages sent over the Byzantine edge (v1, v2) might be corrupted.
Phase 1: Propagating heard Bundles. The first phase consists of O(D log n) iterations, each
iteration will be implemented in O(D) rounds. In each iteration i the nodes will decide to ignore
some of their incoming messages in a probabilistic manner. This process can be viewed as a
directed variant of the fault-tolerant sampling technique. We next explain the i’th iteration in
details.
The i’th Iteration: At the beginning of the iteration, each node u defines the set Ai(u) of its
active incoming edges on which it agrees to receive messages in this iteration. The set Ai(u) is
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defined by sampling each edge (v, u) into Ai(u) independently with probability p = 1− 1/D.
The messages received through edges (w, v) /∈ Ai(u) will be dropped by u throughout this entire
iteration. From that point on, the heard bundles are propagated over the active set of edges
in the following manner. In the first round, the source s sends the message heard(m0, 0) to all
its neighbors. Upon receiving a heard message heard(m′, `) through an edge (w, u), the node u
applies the following code:
• (i) If (w, u) /∈ Ai(u), the message is dropped.
• (ii) If u received a message with the header heard(m′, `′) for `′ ≤ 3D in a prior round, the
message is dropped as well.
• (iii) If (i) and (ii) do not hold, u stores the message, and sends to all its neighbors heard(m′, `+
1), followed by the last edge (w, u) of the path. In the next ` rounds, all messages received
on the edge (w, u) will be appended into one path of length ` + 1 that will be stored at
u. The node u keeps a queue of all its received header messages heard(m′′, `′′). The cor-
responding heard bundles will be handled in the order of their receival (the first will be
handled first). Once u starts handling a message heard(m′′, `′′) it will be committed to send
in the next `′′ + 1 rounds the `′′ + 1 edges of the path in a reverse order. Only once it
finishes handling this heard bundle, it will start handling the next one in its queue. The
paths stored by the nodes will be simple (rather than walks).
Phase 2: Propagating accept messages. The second phase consists of O(D) rounds, in which
accept messages are sent from the source s to all nodes in the graph as follows. In the first round
of this phase, the source s sends accept(m0) to all its neighbors. Every vertex v ∈ V \ {s}, decides
to accept a message m′ if it has received accept(m′) from a neighbor w, and stored heard(m′, len, P)
during the first phase, such that (v, w), (w, v) /∈ P. Upon accepting the message m′, the node v
sends accept(m′) on all its edges. This completes the description of the algorithm.
Correctness. We next prove the correctness of the algorithm. We begin with showing that no
vertex accepts a wrong message.
Claim 19. No node u ∈ V accepts a message m′ 6= m0 in the second phase.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exists at least one vertex which accepts a message
m′ 6= m0 during the second phase. Let u be the first vertex that accepts m′. By first we mean
that any other node that accepted m′, accepted the messages in a later round than u breaking ties
arbitrarily. Hence, according to the algorithm, u received an accept(m′) message from a neighbor
w1, and a heard(m′, `, P) bundle from a neighbor w2 such that (u, w1), (w1, u) /∈ P. Since u is the
first vertex that accepts m′, the vertex w1 did not accept m′ in the previous round. We conclude
that the edge (w1, u) is the Byzantine edge and all other edges are reliable. Denote the path
P = (v0, v1, v2, . . . , vk = w2). We show by induction on i that the edge (vk−i−1, vk−i) exists in
G, and that the vertex vk−i received a message bundle heard(m′, ` − i, Pk−i) from vk−i−1 where
Pk−i = (v0, v1, v2, . . . , vk−i−1). For i = 0, u receives the bundle heard(m′, `, P) from vk = w2. Since
the edge (vk, u) is reliable, indeed vk received the bundle of messages heard(m′, `− 1, Pk−1) over
the edge (wk−1, wk). Assume that the claim is correct up to the vertex vk−(i−1). By the induction
assumption vk−i+1 received a message bundle heard(m′, `− i + 1, Pk−i+1) from vk−i. Because the
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Byzantine edge (w1, u) is not part of Pk−i, the edge (vk−i, vk−i+1) is reliable. Thus, because vk−i+1
received a bundle heard(m′, `− i + 1, Pk−i+1) from vk−i and (vk−i, vk−i+1) is reliable, vk−i indeed
sent heard(m′, `− i+ 1, Pk−i+1) to vk−i+1. By the definition of the algorithm we conclude that vk−i
received heard(m′, `− i, Pk−i) from vk−i.
Hence, v1 received the message heard(m′, 0) from v0 over the reliable edge (v0, v1). Since the
only vertex that sends a message with path length 0 is the source node s, we got to a contradiction
as m′ 6= m0.
From Claim 19 we can conclude that in the case were the Byzantine edge initiates a false
Broadcast it will not be accepted by any of the vertices.
Corollary 20. In case e′ = (v1, v2) initiates a false Byzantine Broadcast, no vertex in G will accept any
message.
Proof. Since no node initiated the Broadcast, in the second phase the only vertices that can receive
accept(m) messages are v1 and v2 over the edge e′. In addition, since e′ also initiates the first phase
every vertex receiving a bundle heard(m, `, P) it must hold that either (v1, v2) ∈ P or (v2, v1) ∈ P.
Hence, we can conclude that neither v1 nor v2 accepts any of the false messages. Consequently,
no vertex in V \ {v1, v2} receives an accepts(m) message for any m, as required.
So-far we showed that if a vertex v accepts a message it must be the correct one. It remains
to show that each vertex indeed accepts a message during the second phase. Toward that goal,
we begin with the following auxiliary claim.
Claim 21. Consider an iteration i in the first phase and a fixed vertex v such that there exists an s-v
path P = (s = v0, v1, v2 . . . , v` = v) where (i) ` ≤ 3D, (ii) e′ /∈ P and (iii) (vj, vj+1) ∈ Ai(vj+1) for
every j ∈ {0, . . . , `− 1} (i.e., the messages on the edges of P are not ignored), then v receives a message
heard(m0, `′, P′) during that iteration.
Proof. Given a vertex vj ∈ P, let τj(m0) be the round in which vj sent a header message heard(m0, `j)
regarding m0. W.l.o.g τ0(m0) = 0, as v0 = s. Our goal is to show that τ`−1(m0) = O(D) and
therefore v = v` receives a message heard(m0, `′, P′) during the ith iteration. Assume without loss
of generality that each vertex vj receives a header message regarding m0 for the first time from
vj−1. If vj received m0 for the first time from a different neighbor in an earlier round, since the
messages are sent using a pipeline in a sequential manner, the time it sends the heard message
can only decrease. Denote by
Mj = {m | vj received a header message heard(m, `′) no later than round τj−1(m0)} .
Note that since every node vj receives a header heard(m0, `′) for the first time from vj−1,
because the messages are sent sequentially, it holds that Mj−1 ⊆ Mj.
For a message m ∈ Mj, let `j(m) be the path length in the header message heard(m, `j(m))
that vj sent during the iteration i.e. v received and stored the header message heard(m, `j(m)− 1).
For a message m ∈ Mj denote by `∗j (m) = maxt≤j `t(m), and let τ′j (m0) = j +∑m∈Mj `∗j (m) be an
upper bound on τj(m0).
We next prove by induction on j that τj(m0) ≤ τ′j (m0). For j = 1 the node v1 receives the
message heard(m0, 0) from the source v0 = s in round 0. By the definition of M1 it holds that for
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every message m ∈ M1 the header of m was received in round 0. Because the messages are sent
in a sequential manner using a pipeline, we conclude that
τ1(m0) = 1+ ∑
m∈M1
`1(m) = 1+ ∑
m∈M1
`∗1(m) = τ
′
1(m0) .
Assume the claim holds for vertices v1, . . . vj and consider the vertex vj+1. By the induction as-
sumption vj+1 received the header heard(m0, `j(m0)) by round τj(m0) ≤ τ′j (m0) = j+∑m∈Mj `∗j (m).
Note that for every message m ∈ Mj∩Mj+1 = Mj the node vj+1 received the header heard(m, `j+1(m)−
1) by round τj(m) (when it received it from vj). We conclude that
τj+1(m0) ≤ 1+ τ′j (m0) + ∑
m∈Mj
max{`j+1(m)− `∗j (m), 0}) + ∑
m∈Mj+1\Mj
`j+1(m)
= 1+ j + ∑
m∈Mj
(`∗j (m) +max{`j+1(m)− `∗j (m), 0}) + ∑
m∈Mj+1\Mj
`j+1(m)
= j + 1+ ∑
m∈Mj+1
`∗j+1(m) = τ
′
j+1(m0) .
Recall that at the end of the weak Broadcast algorithm, each node v obtained a set of values
Mv and any value m′ /∈ Mv is ignored during the Algorithm. Hence, for every j ∈ [`] the set
M` ⊆ ⋃u Mu where ⋃u Mu is of constant size c. We conclude that for v` = v it holds that v
receives the header of the message m0 by round `− 1 + ∑m∈M`−1 `∗(m) ≤ 3D + c · 4D = O(D),
where the 4D factor is due to the 3D bound on the path length when sending a heard bundle.
Finally, we show that indeed all vertices in V accepts the message m0 during the second
phase. The next claim is heavily built up on the fact the graph is 3-edge connected.
Claim 22. W.h.p., all vertices in V accept the message m0 within O(D) rounds after the second phase
begins.
Proof of Claim 22. Let T be a BFS tree rooted at s in G \ {e′}, and let p(v) be the parent of vertex
v in the tree. First we claim that with high probability each vertex v receives and stores a bundle
heard(m0, `, P) such that (v, p(v)), (p(v), v) /∈ P during the first phase. Because the graph is 3–
edge connected, for every vertex v there exists a path P from s to v that does not contain both the
edge (v, p(v)) and e′ of length |P| ≤ 3D. For a given iteration in the first phase, the probability
that all the (directed) edges of P are not ignored but the directed edge from p(v) to v is ignored
is at least
(1− 1/D)3D · 1
D
.
Due to Claim 21 and the fact that the edge (v, p(v)) is reliable, in such an iteration v will indeed
receive a bundle of the form heard(m0, `, P′) where P′ does not contain (p(v), v) and (v, p(v)).
Hence, because we have O(D log n) iterations, with high probability every vertex v ∈ V receives
and stores a message heard(m0, `, P) such that (p(v), v), (v, p(v)) /∈ P during the first phase.
We next show by induction on i that all vertices in layer i of the tree T accepts m0 by round
i of the second iteration. For vertex v in the first layer, with high probability v stored a bundle
heard(m0, `, P) s.t (s, v), (v, s) /∈ P and therefore after one round v accepts m0. Assume the claim
is correct for all vertices in all layers up to i and let v be a vertex in the ith layer. By the induction
assumption p(v) sent accept(m0) by round i − 1. Because v stored a bundle heard(m0, `, P) s.t
(v, p(v)), (p(v), v) /∈ P with high probability, v accepts m0 by round i.
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Running Time. Combining Claim 21 and Claim 22 it is enough to perform each of the O(D log n)
iterations of the first phase for O(D) rounds. By Claim 22 the second phase requires additional
O(D) rounds. Hence, the Broadcast algorithm requires O(D2 · log n) rounds.
Remark. Both the protocol for weak Broadcast and Byzantine Broadcast can be performed when
the source node is unknown to the other vertices. In both protocols it is only required that the
source will initiate the different phases of the algorithms. Moreover, by Corollary 20 in case
where the Byzantine edge starts a false broadcast execution, no vertex will accept any of the
messages sent by e′.
2.3 Computing Byzantine Broadcast with Unknown Diameter Bound
In Section 2.2 we showed an O(D2 · log n) algorithm for the Byzantine Broadcast problem while
assuming all vertices in the graph have a prior knowledge of the diameter D. We next show how
to modify the algorithm when the diameter of the graph is unknown, while paying an overhead
of O(log D) in the round complexity, this would establish Theorem 2.
Denote the algorithm for Byzantine Broadcast with known diameter described in Section 2.2
as A. In the high level, we execute algorithm A repeatedly for O(log D) iterations. In each
iteration i, the source node s applies algorithm A with an estimated diameter bound Di = 2i. As
long as there exists a node v ∈ V that did not determine an output value, v informs it to s using
algorithm A, and s continues to the next iteration while increasing Di.
2.3.1 The Algorithm
The algorithm applies the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm A of Section 2.2 for O(log D) iterations
in the following manner.
Iteration i. At the beginning of iteration i, the source node s applies algorithm A with a diame-
ter estimation Di = 2i and the desired message m0. Denote all vertices that accepted the message
m0 by Ai and let Ni = V \ Ai be the vertices that did not receive the message.
Step 2. In the second step, the vertices in Ni inform s that they did not finish. This is done by
letting all vertices in Ni broadcast the same designated message, say M, using algorithm A with
diameter bound 19Di. The Broadcast is done in parallel from the |Ni| multiple sources.
If the source node s receives and accepts the message M during the second step, it continues
to the next iteration i + 1. If after O(D2i log n) rounds s did not receive and accept the message
M, it broadcasts a termination message to all vertices in V using algorithm A and diameter
estimation 4Di. Once a vertex v ∈ V receives the termination message, it finishes the execution
with the output message it received so far. We can also obtain a diameter estimation using the
diameter Di where i is the iteration in which v received the termination message.
2.3.2 Correctness.
We begin with noting that no vertex v ∈ V accepts a wrong message m′ 6= m0.
Observation 23. No node v ∈ V accepts a wrong message m′ 6= m0.
Proof. Follows from Claim 19 and the correctness of algorithm A.
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Our next goal is to show that if Ni 6= ∅, with high probability s will accept the message M by
the end of iteration i. We begin with the following auxiliary claims.
Claim 24. For every v ∈ Ai \ {s} there exists a path from s to v in G \ {e′} of length at most 6Di .
Proof. For a vertex v that accepts the message m0 in the ith iteration, according to algorithm
A, it receives an accept(m0) message from a neighbor w in Phase 2 and stored a message
heard(m0, `′, P′) in Phase 1, such that (v, w) /∈ P′, ` ≤ 3Di. Let P1 be the path of edges that
the message accept(m0) passed toward v. Since the second phase is executed for 3Di rounds it
holds that |P1| ≤ 3Di. If e′ /∈ P1, because s is the only node initiating accept(m0) messages (except
maybe e′), P1 is a path from s to v in G \ {e′} as required.
Assume e′ ∈ P1, and denote e′ = (v1, v2). Without loss of generality, assume that v1 is closer
to v than v2 in P1. Hence, v1 received an accept(m0) message from v2 during Phase 2. Because v1
also sends the message accept(m0) over P1, it accepts the message. Hence, according to algorithm
A, the node v1 stores a message heard(m0, `, P) during the first phase, where ` ≤ 3Di and e′ /∈ P.
Since s is the only node initiating heard bundles (except e′), we conclude that P is a path from s
to v1 of length ` ≤ 3Di. We thus have that P ◦ P1[v1, v] is a path of length at most 6Di from s to v
in G \ {e′} as required.
Consider the second step of the algorithm where the vertices in Ni broadcast the message M
toward s. Since all vertices in Ni broadcast the same message M, we refer to the second step as
one execution of A with multiple sources. Recall that algorithm A begins with the algorithm for
weak Broadcast (Theorem 1). We claim that all vertices in V received the message M during the
weak Broadcast algorithm.
Claim 25. For every v ∈ V it holds that M ∈ Mv during the second step of the algorithm.
Proof. First note that because G is 3–edge connected, there exists at least two reliable edges
between the source nodes Ni and Ai. By Claim 24, for v ∈ Ai with a neighbor in Ni, there exists
a path from v to s of length at most 6Di in G \ {e′}. Hence, according to Claim 24 every vertex
u ∈ Ai has a path of length at most 12Di + 1 < 19Di to a source in Ni in G \ {e′}.
Thus, in the first step of the weak Broadcast algorithm, all vertices in V receive a message
and define a parent. Moreover, since G contains a single Byzantine edge, the obtained forest
F = (E′, V) contains at most two trees T1, T2 with values m1, m2 6= M. Since G \ {e′} is 2–edge
connected, at least one of the trees T1, T2 has a reliable cross edge to a tree T with a root w ∈ Ni.
Moreover, if w.l.o.g T2 is not connected to a tree T 6= T1, it must be connected to T1. Hence using
the same arguments as used in Section 2.2, we conclude that M ∈ Mv for every v ∈ V.
Recall that after applying the algorithm for weak Broadcast, algorithm A proceeds in two
phases. In the first phase the source nodes send heard bundles, and in the second phase they
send accept messages. We next show that if Ni 6= ∅ there exists a vertex u ∈ Ai that accepts M
during Phase 2.
Claim 26. With high probability, there exists a vertex v ∈ Ai that accepts the message M after one round
of Phase 2 during the second step.
Proof. Since G is 3–edge connected the graph G \ {e′} is 2–edge connected, and therefore there
exists at least two reliable edges between Ni and Ai. In case there exists a vertex u ∈ Ai with two
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neighbors w1, w2 ∈ Ni, according to algorithm A, with high probability in Phase 1 there exists
an iteration where the edge (u, w1) is sampled and (u, w2) is not samples. Thus, w.h.p, u stored
a heard message heard(M, `, P) where (u, w2) /∈ P. Therefore, in the first round of the second
phase u receives accept(M) from w2 and accepts the message M.
Assume that there exist two vertices u1, u2 with neighbors w1, w2 ∈ Ni respectively. We
start by showing that with high probability u2 stores a heard message heard(M, `′, P′) such that
(w2, u2) /∈ P′ during the first phase. Due to Claim 24 there exists a path P1 from u1 to s and a path
P2 from s to u2 in G \ {e′}, both of length at most 6Di. Hence, the simple w1 − u2 path P formed
from the path (w1, u1) ◦ P1 ◦ P2 if of length at most 12D1 + 1 < 19Di, origins at w1 ∈ Ni and does
not contain the edges e′, (w2, u2). Thus, with high probability there exists an iteration j in Phase
1 such that all (directed) edges in P are sampled and (w2, u2) is not sampled. Using Claim 21 we
conclude that during iteration j with high probability u2 stores a heard bundle heard(M, `′, P′)
such that (w2, u2) /∈ P′.
Since w2 ∈ Ni, in the first round of Phase 2 it sends an accept(M) message to v, and according
to algorithm A, the node u2 accepts the message after one round.
We are now ready to show that with high probability the source node s accepts the message
M by the end of Step 2 in the i′th iteration.
Claim 27. If Ni 6= ∅, with high probability, s will accept the message M by the end Step 2 in iteration i.
Proof. By Claim 26, w.h.p there exists a vertex u ∈ Ai that accepted M in the first round of
Phase 2. Moreover, we saw that u has a reliable edge to a vertex in Ni. Let T be a BFS tree
from s in G \ {e′}, and let P = pi(s, u, T). Note that due to Claim 24, |P| ≤ 6Di. Denote P by
(u = u1, u2, . . . u` = s). We will show by induction on j ∈ [1, `] that with high probability uj
accepts M by round j of Phase 2.
The base case follows from Claim 26. Assume the claim holds for uj and consider uj+1. If
uj+1 ∈ Ni then uj+1 is one of the source nodes that broadcast the message M, and therefore
accepts M in the first round of the first phase.
Assume uj+1 ∈ Ai. We first show that there exists a path of length at most 19Di from
some vertex in Ni to uj+1 that does not contain the edges e′, (uj, uj+1). Since G \ {e′} is 2–edge
connected, there exists a path P′ from a vertex wk ∈ Ni to s that does not contain the edge
(uj, uj+1). Consider the shortest such path P′, and denote it by P′ = (s, w1, w2, . . . , wk). Since P′ is
the shortest path from s to Ni in G \ {e′, (uj, uj+1)} it holds that wk ∈ Ni and wt ∈ Ai for every
t 6= k. Let wt be the farthest vertex from s on P′ such that wt ∈ Ai and wt /∈ T(uj), where T(uj) is
the sub-tree of T rooted at uj. Note that since wt /∈ T(uj) all edges in the shortest path pi(wt, s, T)
are in G \ {e′, (uj, uj+1)}. Thus, combining Claim 24 and the fact that P′ is the shortest such path,
it holds that |P′[s, wt]| ≤ 6Di. If wt+1 = wk ∈ Ni, the path P′′ = P[uj+1, s] ◦ P′[wt+1] is a path of
length at most 12Di + 1 from uj+1 to Ni that does not contain the edges e′, (uj, uj+1).
Otherwise, wt+1 ∈ T(uj). Since u = u1 has a reliable edge to a neighbor w ∈ Ni, the path
P′′ = (w, u) ◦ P[u, uj] ◦ pi(uj, wt+1, T) ◦ P′[wt+1, s] ◦ P[s, uj+1]
is of length at most (6Di − j) + 6Di + 6Di + j + 1 = 18Di + 1 ≤ 19Di from Ni to uj+1 and does
not contain the edges e′, (uj, uj+1).
Since in Step 2 all source nodes Ni use diameter estimation 19Di, with high probability, there
exists an iteration in Phase 1, where all (directed) edges in P′′ are sampled and the edge (uj+1, uj)
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is not sampled. Using Claim 21, we conclude that with high probability uj+1 stores a message
heard(M, `′, Pˆ) such that (uj, uj+1) /∈ Pˆ during Phase 1. By the induction assumption uj sends
uj+1 an accept(M) message in round j of Phase 2, and according to algorithm A the vertex uj+1
will accept the message M in round j + 1 as required.
We observe that when Di < D/4, since D is the diameter of G there must exist a vertex w ∈ V
that did not accept the message m0 and therefore Ni 6= ∅. On the other hand, by the correctness
of algorithm A when Di ≥ D, with high probability all vertices in V receive and accept the
message m0 by the end of the ith iteration and Ni = ∅. Hence, in the iteration i where no vertex
broadcasts the message M and s decides to terminate the execution, it holds that Di ∈ [D/4, D].
Since s broadcasts the termination message with diameter estimation 4Di, we conclude that with
high probability all vertices in V will finish the execution as required.
Removing the simultaneous wake-up assumption: In the second step where we inform s
to continue to the next iteration, we can modify the algorithm such that the Broadcast of the
message M is performed by every vertex v ∈ Ni with a neighbor w ∈ Ai such that (v, w) 6= e′.
This modification allows us to omit the assumption on the simultaneous wake-up.
2.4 Byzantine Leader Election
We next show that using our Byzantine Broadcast algorithm we can also elect a unique leader
within O˜(D2) rounds and prove Lemma 3. This holds provided that the nodes have any poly-
nomial upper bound on the number of nodes in the network denoted as N, and a linear upper
bound of the graphs diameter denoted as D′.
We begin with describing a modification of the Broadcast algorithm with known diameter
described in Section 2.2.
Modification of the Broadcast Algorithm. Define x = O(log N) where the exact value of x will
be chosen according to required success probability of Lemma 3. We add the following modifi-
cations to the broadcast algorithm described in Section 2.2, and denote the modified algorithm
by BC′.
1. In the weak-Broadcast phase, we perform x+ 2 iterations of steps 2-4 (instead of two) where
in each of the steps 2-4 we allow each vertex v to receive x + 2 messages, and add x + 2
messages to the final set Mv.
2. In the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm, we perform O(D′ log N) iteration, where each iter-
ation is executed for O(x2 · D′) rounds (instead of O(D′)). In addition, we perform the
second phase for O(x · D′) rounds.
We now show some nice properties of the modified algorithm BC′ when executed in parallel
from k ≤ x sources s1, . . . sk with corresponding messages m1, . . . mk.
First note that because the weak Broadcast is performed with x + 2 iterations and in each
iterations every node receives at most x + 2 messages over an edge (that are not ignored), we
conclude that the total number of messages is O(x2).
Observation 28. At the end of the weak Broadcast phase of BC′ it holds that |⋃u Mu| = O(x2)
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Since k ≤ x, we claim that all vertices receives the messages m1, m2 . . . mk during the weak
Broadcast phase.
Claim 29. At the end of the weak broadcast phase of BC′, for every v ∈ V and message mi it holds that
mi ∈ Mv.
Proof. First note that since k ≤ x after Step 1 there are at most x+ 2 trees in the forest F. Consider
a source si with a message mi and let Ti be the tree rooted at si in the forest. Note that all vertices
in V(Ti) add mi to their output in the first application. Next, a simple adaptation of the analysis
of Theorem 1 shows that for every tree T ∈ F with a reliable cross-edge to Ti all vertices in
V(T) add mi to the output set during the first application. We can now proceed in an inductive
manner and deduce that for every tree T at distance j from Ti it holds that V(T) will add mi to
the output set by the end of the jth application, where the distance is with respect to the reliable
edges between the trees in the forest F. Since F consists at most x+ 2 trees and the graph G \ {e′}
is connected, we conclude that all vertices in V accepts the message mi by the end of the weak
Broadcast phase.
Claim 30. At the end of the algorithm BC′ every vertex v accepts all messages m1, . . . mk.
Proof. By Claim 29 after the weak Broadcast phase for every v ∈ V and message mi it holds
that mi ∈ Mv. For a source si let Ti be a BFS tree rooted at si in G \ {e′}. Since G is 3-edge
connected, for every vertex v there exists a path P from si to v of length at most 3D in G \ {e′}
that does not contain the edge between v and its parent p(v) in Ti. Thus, with high probability
there exists an iteration i in Phase 1 such that all directed edges of P are sampled and the edge
(p(v), v) is not sampled. Since after the weak Broadcast phase the total number of different
messages in
⋃
u Mu is O(x2), using the same argument as in Claim 21 w.h.p v will store a heard
bundle heard(mi, `i, Pi) in the first phase such that (p(v), v) /∈ Pi. Hence, followed by Claim 22
we conclude that with high probability all vertices in V accepts all messages m1, . . . mk during
the second phase of algorithm BC′.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let N′ = dlog Ne. The nodes apply ` = O(log n) iterations until they receive
an ID of at least one node. Each iteration i ∈ {0, . . . , `} consists of O˜(D′2) rounds. Specifically,
iteration i starts by letting each node u being sampled independently with probability 1/Ni
where Ni = 2N
′−i. A sampled node u initiates a modified Byzantine Broadcast algorithm BC′
with a message mu = (ID(u)). For every node v, let Sv be the set of all messages that v accepted
during this iteration. If |Sv| 6= ∅, then v outputs LE(v) = {max(ID(u)) | mu ∈ Sv} and stops.
I.e., it will not sample itself in the future experiments j ≥ i + 1 and would not send messages.
This concludes the description of the i’th iteration. Each iteration will last for a fixed number of
O˜(D′2) rounds, even if no node gets sampled.
We now analyze the algorithm. We first claim that LE(v) = LE(u) for all nodes u, v, and that
LE(v) corresponds to an ID of a real node in G. Consider the first iteration i in which at least one
node got successfully sampled, and let Vi the set of all nodes that got sampled in this iteration.
By a simple application of Chernoff, it is easy to see that w.h.p. there exists such an iteration i,
and moreover that |Vi| = O(log n) = O(log N). We will choose x in the BC’ algorithm according
to the required success requirement and the Chernoff bound 9. Since each node u ∈ Vi initiated
9Since n ≤ N and we only seek for an upper bound, the parameter x can be determined locally using the estimation
N.
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the modified Byzantine Broadcast algorithm BC′ and the number of sources |Vi| is at most x, by
Claim 30 at the end of the ith iteration all nodes obtain the IDs of all nodes in Vi. Thus, the output
LE(u) of every node u corresponds to the node of largest ID in Vi.
It remains to bound the round complexity. Since x = O(log N) = O(log n) the modified
algorithm BC′ is implemented in O˜(D′2) = O˜(D2) rounds, and the total number of iterations is
O(log n). The lemma follows.
3 Byzantine Cycle Covers and Compilers
Our constructions are based on a new notion of Byzantine cycle covers, which extends the notion
of low-congestion cycle covers by [30] to the Byzantine setting. For a fixed (unknown) Byzantine
edge e′, the Byzantine cycle cover provides a safe cycle (i.e., free of e′) for every edge in the graph.
As we will see, these cycles allow one to efficiently simulate every round of the given distributed
algorithm in a reliable manner. In this section we prove Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
The structure of this section is as follows. In Subsec. 3.1, we present a randomized algorithm
for Byzantine cycle covers in a reliable communication graph. Simulating this algorithm in the
presence of a Byzantine edge brings along various challenges that are handled by a two step
approach. First, in Subsection 3.2.1, we show that the randomized algorithm of Subsec. 3.1 can
be implemented using only O˜(1) random bits. This is obtained by combining the power of PRGs
that fool read-once CNF formulas along with families of k-wise independence hash functions.
This O˜(1)-length seed is then shared to all nodes by applying the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm
of Sec. 2. Finally, in Subsec. 3.3, we show how the BCC can be computed efficiently, given the
short seed, in the presence of the Byzantine edge.
3.1 Computation of BCC in a Safe Communication Graph
The construction is based on combining a sampling technique with the distributed algorithm of
[31] for computing (c, d) cycle covers.
Fact 31. [31, 30] There is a randomized algorithm A that for any n-vertex input graph G = (V, E)
computes, w.h.p., a cycle collection C with the following properties: (1) each edge e ∈ G is covered by a
cycle in C of length Ô(|Ce|) where Ce is the length of the shortest cycle in G that covers e, and (2) each
edge appears on Ô(1) cycles. The algorithm A runs in Ô(D) rounds.
In Appendix A, we show that we can slightly modify the algorithm A from [31, 30] such that
each node u will also know an Ô(1)-bit identifier for each of the cycles it belongs to.
We next show that this algorithm can be used to obtain a BCC at the cost of paying an over-
head of O˜(D) in the number of rounds and in the edge congestion of the cycles. The algorithm
consists of ` = O(D log n) iterations. In each iteration i the algorithm first samples a subgraph
Gi by including each edge e ∈ G into Gi independently with probability p = (1− 1/D). It then
applies Algorithm A, from Fact 31, on the graph Gi resulting in a cycle cover Ci. The final cycle
collection is given by C = ⋃`i=1 Ci, that is, the union of all cycles computed in the ` iterations. We
next analyze the construction.
The round complexity, the length and the edge congestion bounds follow immediately. It
therefore remains to show that the cycle collection C is indeed a BCC. To see this, consider a
fixed pair of edges e, e′. We will show that w.h.p. C contains a cycle Ce,e′ that contains e and does
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not contain e′. An iteration i is defined to be good for the edge pair e = (u, v), e′ if the following
two events occur:
{e} ∪ pi(u, v, G \ {e′, e}) ⊂ Gi and e′ /∈ Gi . (1)
Note that since the graph is 3-edge connected, the path pi(u, v, G \ {e′, e}) indeed exists, and its
length can be bounded by O(D). Since every edge is sampled into Gi independently with proba-
bility p, the probability that iteration i is good for e, e′ is at least pO(D) · (1− p) = Ω(1/D). Let Xi
be the random variable for the event that iteration i is good for e, e′, and let X = ∑log ni=1 Xi. Then,
E[X] = Θ(log n) and by a simple application of Chernoff, X = Θ(log n) with high probability.
Consequently, there exists a good iteration i∗ for e, e′. We next show that e, e′ are successfully
covered in iteration i∗.
In iteration i∗, the algorithm A is applied on the graph Gi. By the properties of algorithm
A, the edge e is covered by a cycle C of length O˜(|pi(u, v, G \ {e′, e})|) = O˜(D). In addition, as
e′ /∈ G′ this cycle does not contain e′ as required. By applying the union bound over all e, e′ pairs,
we get that w.h.p. C is a BCC. Lemma 5 follows.
3.2 Computation of BCC in the Presence of a Byzantine Edge
3.2.1 BCC with Small Random Seeds
The randomized algorithm of Lemma 5 consists of O(D log n) iterations. The key argument
for the correctness of this procedure is based on showing that each iteration i is good (in the
sense of satisfying Eq. (1) for a fixed pair of edges with probability of Ω(1/D). As this event
is defined only on O(D) edges, it follows that sampling the edges using a D-wise independent
hash function is sufficient. As the algorithm is repeated for O(D log n) times, this requires a total
random seed of length O(D log2 n) bits. Our approach for computing a BCC in the presence
of Byzantine edge is based on first broadcasting the seed to all nodes in the graph, and then
carefully implementing the algorithm of Lemma 5 using this seed. As the efficiency of this
approach heavily depends on the size of the seed, in this section we show that the algorithm of
Lemma 5 can in fact be implemented with a random seed of only O˜(1) bits. That is, we will show
that if all nodes know a random seed of O˜(1) bits, w.h.p., they can compute a BCC within Ô(D)
rounds.
The structure of our argument is as follows. We first show that a single iteration of the
sampling procedure can be implemented using r = O(log n(log log n)3) random bits. That is, we
show that if all nodes share a seed of r random bits, then for every fixed pair e, e′ the sampled
graph obtained using this seed satisfies the event of Eq. (1) with probability Ω(1/D). This
immediately implies that the entire algorithm, which consists of O(D log n) iterations, can be
implemented with O(kD log n) bits. In the next step, we derandomize the algorithm even further
and show that using O(log n)-wise independence hash functions, one can simulate the entire
O(D log n) iterations with a seed of length poly(log n).
Single Iteration with a Seed Length O(log n(log log n)3). Our key observation is that for any
pair 〈A, e′〉 where A ⊆ E, the event that all edges A are sampled into Gi and e′ /∈ Gi can be
expressed by a read-once CNF formula. Thus, in order to get a short seed it suffices to have a
pseudoranom generator (PRG) that can “fool” read-once CNFs. A PRG is a function that gets a
short random seed and expands it to a long one which is indistinguishable from a random seed
30
of the same length for such a formula. Gopalan et al. [20] showed such a PRG that have a seed
length of O(log n · (log log n)3). Our application of their PRGs follow a similar line to that of [29].
We begin by setting up some notation. For a function PRG and an index i, let PRG(s)i be the
ith bit of PRG(s).
Definition 32 (Pseudorandom Generators). A generator PRG : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n is an e-pseudorandom
generator (PRG) for a class C of Boolean functions if for every f ∈ C:
| E
x∼{0,1}n
[ f (x)]− E
s∼{0,1}r
[ f (PRG(s))] | ≤ e.
We refer to r as the seed-length of the generator and say PRG is explicit if there is an efficient algorithm to
compute it that runs in time poly(n, 1/e).
We use the construction of [20] to provide a PRG for CNFs with a short seed.
Theorem 33. [20] For every e = e(n) > 0, there exists an explicit pseudorandom generator, PRG : {0, 1}r →
{0, 1}n that fools all read-once CNFs on n-variables with error at most e and seed-length r = O((log(n/e)) ·
(log log(n/e))3).
Using the notation above, and Theorem 33 we formulate and prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 34. Let G be an n-vertex graph, and m be integer where m = poly(n). For every D ≤ n, there
exists a family of hash functions H = {h : [m] → {0, 1}} such that choosing a random function from H
takes r = O(log n · (log log n)3) random bits, such that for Zh = {e ∈ [m] : h(e) = 0} and any fixed
pair of O(D) edges A and an edge e′ ∈ E it holds that:
Pr
h
[
A ⊂ Zh and e′ /∈ Zh
] ≥ Ω(1/D)− 1/n2.
Proof. We first describe the construction of H. Let p = 1 − c/D for some large constant c,
and let ` = blog 1/pc. Let PRG : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m` be the PRG constructed in Theorem 33
for r = O(log n` · (log log n`)3) = O(log n · (log log n)3) and for e = 1/n10c. For a string s of
length r we define the hash function hs(j) as follows. First, it computes y = PRG(s). Then, it
interprets y as m blocks where each block is of length ` bits, and outputs 1 if and only if all
the bits of the jth block are 1. Formally, we define hs(j) =
∧j`
k=(j−1)`+1 PRG(s)k. We show that
the requirement holds for the set Zhs where hs ∈ H and a fixed set of O(D) edges A ⊂ E and
e′ ∈ E \ A. For j ∈ [m] let Xj = hs(j) be a random variable where s ∼ {0, 1}r. Let the IDs of
the edges in A be given by j1, . . . , jk and let j∗ be the ID of the edge e. We need to show that
Prs∼{0,1}r [Xj1 ∧ Xj2 ∧ . . . ∧ Xjk ∧ ¬Xj∗ = 1] ≥ 1/D + 1/n2. Let f j : {0, 1}m` → {0, 1} be a function
that outputs 1 if the jth block is all 1’s. That is, f j(y) =
∧j`
z=(j−1)`+1 yj. Since f j is a read-once CNF
formula we have that ∣∣∣∣∣ Ey∼{0,1}m`[ f j(y)]− Es∼{0,1}r[ f j(PRG(s))]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ e.
Thus the event where A ⊂ Zh can be written as a read-once CNF formula. In addition, the event
where e′ /∈ Zh is obtained in case where at least one of the ` bits of the j∗’th block is zero, which
can be expressed as a CNF formula as well. Over all, we have that the good event where A ⊂ Zh
and e′ /∈ Zh is a read-once CNF formula, and Prh[A ⊂ Zh and e′ /∈ Zh] ≥ Ω(1/D)− 1/e. The
claim follows by setting e = 1/ poly(n).
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We are now ready to complete the description of the BCC algorithm when using a random
seed of length r = O(log n(log log n)3). The algorithm has ` = O(D log n) iterations. In each
iteration i, let si ∼ {0, 1}r be a random seed shared by all nodes. The nodes then locally interpret
the vector yi = PRG(si) as m blocks, one per possible edge in G, where each block is of length
` bits. The vector yi defines the subgraph Gi as follows. For every edge e = (u, v) where
ID(u) < ID(v) let IDu,v be an O(log n)-bit ID of the edge obtained by concatenating10 the IDs of
u and v. Then, to decide whether e = (u, v) ∈ Gi, the nodes u and v consider the 2IDu,v ’th block
of the vector yi, and the edge e joins Gi iff all the bits of this block are set to 1. Lemma 34 then
implies the following:
Corollary 35. The probability that Eq. (1) holds for a given pair e, e′ based on the above definition of Gi
is Ω(1/D).
Therefore, by applying ` independent repetitions, we get that each edge pair e, e′ has a good
iteration with high probability.
O˜(D) Iterations with a Seed Length O˜(1). So-far, we showed that a single iteration of the sam-
pling algorithm can be implemented with a random seed of r = O˜(log n) bits. We next show that
it is sufficient for PRG’s seeds used in each iteration to be only O(log n)-wise independent rather
than fully independent. This would imply that all t = O(D log n) iterations can be implemented
with a seed of poly-logarithm length.
Definition 36 ([39, Definition 3.31]). For N, M, d ∈ N such that d ≤ N, a family of functions
H = h : [N]→ [M] is d-wise independent if for all distinct x1, x2, ..., xd ∈ [N], the random variables
H(x1), ..., H(xd) are independent and uniformly distributed in [M] when H is chosen randomly from H.
In [39] an explicit construction of H is presented, with the following parameters.
Lemma 37 ([39, Corollary 3.34]). For every γ, β, d ∈ N, there is a family of d-wise independent func-
tions Hγ,r = h : {0, 1}γ → {0, 1}r such that choosing a random function from Hγ,r takes d ·max{γ, r}
random bits, and evaluating a function from Hγ,r takes time poly(γ, r, d).
Our construction is based on the family of d-wise independent functions Hγ,β of Lemma 37
with d = O(log n), γ = O(log n) and r = O(log n · log log3 n). By the lemma, choosing a random
function from Hγ,r can be done with a random seed of length a = O(log2 n · log log3 n). Let
s ∼ {0, 1}a be a random seed and let hs be the random function chosen from Hγ,r using seed s.
In every iteration i of the Algorithm of Lemma 5, the nodes will be using the r-length seed
hs(i) ∈ {0, 1}r to define the graph Gi as follows. The r-length seed hs(i) ∈ {0, 1}r is fed into the
PRG function PRG : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m` of Lemma 34 where ` = O(log n). The output m`-length
bit vector y = PRG(hs(i)) is interpreted by the nodes as m blocks where each block is of length
` bits. Every edge (u, v) has ID of size O(log n) bits IDu,v (w.l.o.g., ID(u) < ID(v)). For every
edge e = (u, v), the seed s is interpreted as follows:
e ∈ Gi iff all bits of the ith block in y = PRG(hs(i)) are 1 where i = 2IDu,v . (2)
Using this shared seed s, each node u can decide locally whether each of its incident edges
belong to Gi. Importantly, this decision is consistent between the edge endpoints without using
any communication. The algorithm will repeat this for O(D log2 n) iterations. We next show that
every edge pair e, e′ has a good iteration w.h.p. when the Gi’s are defined based on Eq. (2).
10To make this ID consistent, the ID of the lower-ID endpoint appears first in this concatenation.
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Lemma 38. Using a seed of O˜(1)-bits as explained above for t = O(D log2 n) iterations, then for every
pair of edges e, e′, there exists a good iteration (i.e., satisfying Eq. (1)) with high probability.
Proof. Fix s ∼ {0, 1}a for a = O(log2 n · log log3 n) and a single iteration i. By the definition of
the d-wise independent hash function family Hβ,r, when choosing a function h ∈ Hβ,r with a
seed s ∼ {0, 1}a, all bits of hs(i) are uniformly distributed in {0, 1}r. Thus hs(i) ∼ {0, 1}r and by
applying the argument of Lemma 34 on the graph Gi (defined based on Eq. (2)), we get that the
event of Eq. (1) holds with probability at least 10/D. We next show that w.h.p. at least one of
the t = 20D log2 n iterations is good for e, e′.
Let Xi be the indicator random variable for the event that Eq. (1) holds in iteration i when
using s ∼ {0, 1}a to define the sub-graph Gi (see Eq. (2)). Let X = ∑`i=1 Xi and µ = Es∼{0,1}a [X].
By the linearity of expectation, µ ≥ 2 log2 n. By definition, the random variables hs(1), . . . , hs(t)
are 10 log n-wise independent. Since each Xi is a random variable that depends only on the bits
of hs(i), we get that the Xi’s variables are 10 log n-wise independent. By using the concentration
inequality of Fact 39 with k = 5 log n, we get that
Pr
[
|X− µ| > log2 n
]
≤ c · ((20 log3 n + 100 log2 n)/ log4 n)log n ≤ c/n10 .
The claim holds by applying the union bound over all n2 pairs.
Fact 39. [Theorem 2.3 [3]] Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1} be 2k-wise random variables for some k ∈ N, and let
X = ∑ni=1 Xi and µ = E[X]. Then, for any t > 0 it holds that:
Pr[|X− µ| > A] ≤ c · ((2k · µ+ (2k)2)/A2)k for some constant c ≥ 1.
3.3 The BCC Algorithm in the Byzantine Setting
Step 0: Sharing a Random Seed r of length O˜(1). In order to share the seed, the nodes need to
first pick a leader s. This can be done in O˜(D2) rounds, using Lemma 3. The node s then picks a
random seed r of length O˜(1) and sends it to all the nodes by applying the Byzantine Broadcast
protocol described in Theorem 2.
High Level Structure of the Key Algorithm. The algorithm simulates each of the ` = O(D ·
log2 n) iterations of algorithm in Lemma 5using the seed. That is, in iteration i, the sampled
subgraph Gi is defined by the seed r. Importantly, the decision for each edge e (whether to be
included in Gi) will be consistent between its endpoints, without using communication over that
edge. In each iteration i we will have two steps. The first step applies the cycle cover algorithm
A of Fact 31 over the graph Gi. This results in a cycle set C ′i (u) for every node u. The output
format of algorithm A specifies for each cycle in C ′i (u) also a unique identifier of Ô(1) bits, along
with the full description of the edges on that cycle. Since the Byzantine edge might participate in
Gi, the cycle set C ′i (u) can be totally corrupted. In the second step of iteration i, the nodes apply
a verification procedure for their cycles. Only cycles that passed this verification, will be added
to the set of cycles Ci(u), namely, the verified cycle set of u in iteration i.
In the analysis section, we show that for every edge e = (u, v) 6= e′, there exists at least one
cycle in C(u) = ⋃`i Ci(u) that covers e. The final step handles the covering of the Byzantine edge,
in case needed.
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Step (1) of Iteration i: Building Cycles using Alg. A. Let Gi be the sampled subgraph defined
based on the random seed r as described in Lemma 38. Algorithm A from Fact 31 is applied
on the graph Gi. During the execution of algorithm A, if a vertex v receives an illegal message
it is ignored. Moreover v ignores all future messages it receives in this iteration (v considers
the iteration as faulty). At the end of the execution of algorithm A, each node u performs the
following verification step on its output cycle set C ′i (u).
Step (2) of Iteration i: Cycle Verification. First, each node u performs a local inspection of its
cycles in C ′i (u), and declares it to be faulty if it contains at least one of the following:
• A cycle longer than Ô(D),
• An edge appearing in more than Ô(1) cycles in C ′i (u),
• A truncated cycle (i.e., a walk rather than a cycle).
In the case where C ′i (u) is found to be faulty, the node u defines Ci(u) = ∅ and will remain silent
throughout this verification step. We will call such a node an inactive node. A node whose local
inspection was successful is called active. A node that will detect any problem throughout the
rest of the verification process will become inactive as well.
We now describe the verification code for an active node u. For every cycle C, let vC be
the node with largest ID on C. For each cycle C ∈ C ′i (u), the node vC initiates a verification
messages. Specifically, for every C ∈ C ′i (u), such that vC = u, the node u sends the message
m(C) = (ID(C), ID(vC)) along both of its edges on this cycle (i.e., in both clock-wise and counter
clockwise directions). Every active node v on C that receives a message m(C) through one of its
edges on C, send it through its second edge on C. In this way the message m(C) traverses through
the cycle in both directions.
A leader vC of every cycle C that did not receive its two m(C) messages from both directions
of the cycle C within Ô(D) rounds, initiates a cancellation message, cancel(C), and sends it on
both directions. This indicates the nodes on this cycle that it should be omitted. The cancellation
messages propagate over the cycles in the same manner as the m(C) messages. In the case where
vC receives a cancel(C) message that it did not initiate, vC sends the cancel(C) message again in
both directions, making sure all vertices omit the cycle.
Throughout the algorithm, once a vertex u receives an m(C) message on its two edges in C,
it adds C to the set C ′i(u). If in any subsequent round, one of the following occurs:
• u receives a message with an illegal cycle ID or a cycle not in C ′i (u),
• u receives more than a single m(C) message through a given edge (u, v) in C,
the node u will become inactive in the following sense. It will only pass Ô(1) cancellation
messages for cycles contained in C ′i(u). Upon receiving such a cancellation message for a cycle
C, u will also remove C from C ′i(u). The node u will ignore any other message concerning cycles
not in C ′i(u).
At the end, a vertex v keeps a cycle C ∈ C ′i (v) in its final cycle set Ci(v) if two conditions hold
(i) it received an m(C) message from its two neighbors on that cycle (i.e., both directions), and
(ii) it received no cancellation message cancel(C) for that cycle. This concludes the description of
the i’th iteration. The final output of each node u is C(u) = ⋃`i=1 Ci(u).
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Final Step: Covering the Remaining Edge. At the end of all ` = O(D log2 n) iterations, if there
exists a vertex v with an incident edge e = (v, u) that is not covered by the cycles of C(u), the
endpoint with the higher ID broadcasts the edge e using the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm of
Theorem 2. The reason we broadcast the edge e is in order to prevent the Byzantine edge itself
from initialing this step with false information. In the analysis section we show that w.h.p. there
will be at most one such edge e, and that this edge, if exists, must be the Byzantine edge. W.l.o.g,
assume that v has the higher ID. Then, v initiates a BFS construction rooted at v, while both u
and v ignore the edge e. The node u learns its tree path from v within O(D) rounds and by
unwinding the type of the communication, v learns this path as well. All nodes on P ◦ (u, v), add
this cycle to the list of their verified cycles.
Correctness. We begin with showing the all cycles in C(u) obtained during the first part of the
algorithm are legal and known to all participating vertices.
Claim 40 (Valid Cycles). Fix an iteration i. For every cycle C ∈ Ci(u) it holds that C ∈ Ci(v) for every
v ∈ V(C).
Proof. For a pair of vertices w, u on the cycle C denote by C[w, u] the clockwise path between w
and u. We divide the analysis into two cases.
Case 1: e′ /∈ C. First consider the case where C ∈ Ci(vC). This implies that vC received the
message m(C) from both neighbors on C, and did not send a cancellation massage. Hence,
because all edges in C are reliable, we conclude that no vertex omitted the cycle and every v ∈ C
received m(C) from both directions. Note that even if C contains a node u that becomes inactive
in future iterations, since vC receives m(C) from both direction, it must holds that u received (and
sent) both messages as well. Thus u added C to its cycle set Ci(u).
Next, assume that C /∈ Ci(vC). Since vC is the only vertex that initiates cancellation messages,
either vC omitted the cycle and did not send any verification message, or it did not receive the
message m(C) from one of its neighbors. Since in this case all edges on C are reliable, the third
option of receiving a cancellation message that is not initiated by vC does not exist here. Thus,
there exists a vertex w in C that omitted the cycle and did not forward the m(C) messages. Be-
cause for every vertex v in C either w ∈ C[vC, v] or w ∈ C[vC, cv] we conclude that no vertex
receives both messages m(C), and therefore all these vertices omitted this cycle.
Case 2: e′ ∈ C. First consider the case where C ∈ Ci(vC). Hence, vC received the message
m(C) from both neighbors on C, and did not receive or send a cancellation massage. Assume
there exists a vertex w ∈ C such that C /∈ Ci(w). W.l.o.g, assume the e′ ∈ C[vC, w].
First assume that w omitted the cycle C because it did not receive a message m(C) from both
directions. We claim that in such a case w missed the m(C) message that was sent on the path
C[vC, w] that contains e′. To see this, assume towards contradiction that w missed the massage
from the other path C[w, vC]. Because all edges on the path C[w, vC] are reliable, there exists a
vertex u ∈ C[w, vC] that omitted the cycle C. Therefore u did not send the message m(C) to vC
over the path C[u, vC], leading to a contradiction as vC received m(C) from both directions. Next,
since e′ /∈ C[w, vC] and w did not receive m(C) over the path C[vC, w], it did not forward the
message and vC did not receive both messages, leading to contradiction again.
Now consider the case where w received m(C) from both directions but omitted the cycle
due to a cancellation message cancel(m). Because C ∈ Ci(vC), vC did not send a cancellation
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message, and w received cancel(C) over the path C[vC, w] that contains e′. Hence, because e′ /∈
C[w, vC] when w forwards the message cancel(C) over the path C[w, vC] the message reaches
vC and therefore vC should have omitted C from Ci(vC), leading to a contradiction. The claim
follows.
Claim 41 (Congestion). Fix and iteration i and let Ci = ⋃u Ci(u). Then each edge appears on Ô(1)
cycles in Ci(u). Consequently, each edge appears on Ô(D) cycles in ⋃`i=1 Ci.
Proof. For an iteration i. First note that if e′ /∈ Gi, all edges participating in the ith iteration are
reliable. Hence, due to the properties of algorithm A, all cycles constructed are legal and the
congestion of each edge is Ô(1). For an iteration i such that e′ ∈ Gi, if an endpoint of an edge
e detects high congestion in the cycles construction, it omits all cycles, and becomes inactive.
Hence, for each node v and an incident edge e, after the ith iteration v outputs at most Ô(1)
cycles covering e. Thus, because we have O(D log2 n) iterations, the total congestion of each edge
is Ô(D).
Coverage. We begin with noting that in case where the Byzantine edge e′ is not sampled into
a graph Gi, all cycle sets C ′i (u) are legal. Since the verification step uses only edges in Gi, we
get that Ci(u) = C ′i (u) for every u. Next, using Lemma 38 we can conclude that, with high
probability, all reliable edges are covered by a cycle that does not contain e′.
Observation 42. Every reliable edge e 6= e′ is covered by a cycle that does not contain e′ with high
probability.
Proof. Due to Lemma 38 for every edge e there exists a good iteration i for the pair e, e′. Thus, Gi
contains a cycle of length Ô(D) that covers e and the edge e′ is not sampled into Gi. Hence, by
the properties of the algorithm A and because all edges participating in the iteration are reliable,
a cycle of length Ô(D) that covers e and does not contain e′ is added to the output during the ith
iteration.
We are left to show the Byzantine edge e′ is covered by a legal cycle.
Claim 43. With high probability, the Byzantine edge e′ is covered.
Proof. By Observation 42 with high probability all reliable edges are covered during the first
O(D log2 n) iterations of the algorithm. If the edge e′ is covered as well, no endpoint will initiate
the Broadcast procedure and therefore no additional cycle is constructed.
Assume e′ is not covered during the first O(D log2 n) iterations, and denote e′ = (u, v). By
Observation 42 with high probability all reliable edge are covered and therefore e′ is the only
uncovered edge. W.l.o.g assume that the ID of v is higher than the ID of u. Thus, in the last
step of the algorithm v will broadcast e′ to all vertices and initiate a BFS construction while u
and v ignores e′. Because the graph is 3–edge connected and e′ does not participate in the tree
construction, we compute a BFS tree T in G \ {e′} of depth O(D). Since the edges of T are
reliable, the cycle C = P ◦ (u, v) covers e and the path P are sent in a simple pipeline manner to
u and v within O(D) rounds.
Proof of Lemma 5. The covering property holds by Claim 40, Obs. 42 and Claim 43. The conges-
tion arguments hold by Claim 41. The length bound holds immediately, as all long cycles defined
in bad iterations are omitted.
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It remains to bound the running time. The preliminary Broadcast procedure requires O(D2 log n)
rounds. For each iteration i, performing algorithm A required Ô(D) rounds. Next, during the
verification step the congestion on each edge is kept bound by Ô(1), as any extra message be-
yond this bound is ignored. In addition, since the length of each cycle is Ô(D), the verification
step can be performed in Ô(D) rounds. As for the last step, constructing a BFS and performing
the upcast and downcast steps requires O(D) rounds. We conclude that the total running time
of the algorithm is Ô(D2).
3.4 General Compilers Under Byzantine Edge
We next show that our (c, d) BCC yields a general compiler that translates any r-round distributed
algorithm A into an equivalent algorithm A′ that works in the presence of a Byzantine edge and
runs in r′ = O(r · c · d) rounds. In a recent work, Parter and Yogev [30] presented such a compiler
for the more challenging setting where the identity of the Byzantine edge can alternate between
rounds. Specifically, they showed a compiler for this setting with a round overhead of O(D3)
rounds provided a pre-processing step in which the cycle covers are computed. Our compiler
improves upon that of [30] in two aspects. First, it removes the assumption of preprocessing.
Using the algorithm of the previous section, the cycles are computed in the presences of the
Byzantine edge within Ô(D2) rounds. Secondly, it improves the overhead to Ô(D2).
Lemma 6. The compiler works in a round-by-round fashion, where every round of A is imple-
mented in A′ using a phase of O(c · d2 · r) rounds. At the end of the i’th phase, all nodes will be
able to recover the original messages sent to them in round i of algorithm A.
Let C be the cycle collection of the (c, d) BCC. Fix round i in A and let Me be the message sent
from u to v for every pair of neighbors e = (u, v) ∈ E. In the ith phase of A′ the node u sends
v the message Mu,v through e and all the cycles covering e in C. When sending the messages
each node on a cycle covering e sends at most one message targeted from u to v. If a node w
is requires to send at least two different messages from u to v, then w omits both messages and
sends Φ instead.
At the end of phase i, each node v sets the message M˜u,v as its estimate for the message Mu,v
sent by u in round i of A. The content of M˜u,v is defined by applying the following protocol. In
the case that v receives an identical message M 6= Φ from u through all the cycles covering (u, v),
then M˜u,v ← M. Otherwise, M˜u,v ← M′ where M′ is the message sent by u on the edge (u, v).
We now show that M˜u,v = Mu,v for every edge (u, v). We consider two cases.
Case 1: e = e′ is the Byzantine edge. Since all the cycles covering e do not contain e, they
are reliable. Therefore all messages that v receives through the cycles are identical, and equals to
Mu,v. By the definition of the BCC there exists at least one cycle covering e in C. Hence, v accepts
the correct message.
Case 2: e 6= e′ is reliable. The message that u receives from v through the edge e is Mu,v. By
the definition of the BCC there exists a cycle C ∈ C covering e that does not contains e′. If all edges
on C deliver one message from u to v it must be the correct one. Thus, if all messages v received
through the cycles are identical and differ from Φ, they must be equal to Mu,v. Otherwise, v
accepts the correct message delivered through the edge (u, v).
Round complexity. By the property of the BCC of Lemma 5, the length of the cycles is Ô(D)
and the edge congestion is Ô(D). Since each edge belongs to Ô(D) cycles of length Ô(D), it
needs to send Ô(D2) messages. This can be done in Ô(D3) rounds.
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Lemma 44 (Oblivious Adversary). If the adversary of the Byzantine edge is oblivious to the randomness
of the nodes, then exchanging messages on the BCC can be done in Ô(D2) rounds.
Proof. Each edge e = (u, v) defines an algorithm Ae in which u sends a message to v over
all the cycles that cover (u, v). Since each edge e′′ belongs to Ô(D) cycles and each cycle has
length Ô(D), overall an edge e′′ participates in Ô(D2) algorithms. We will use the random
delay approach of [25, 19]. Specifically, by [19] each algorithm Ae picks a random starting point
te uniformly in the range [O(Ô(D2)/ log n]. For the argument to hold, [19] showed that it is
sufficient for the random starting points to be O(log n)-wise independent. Using the Leader
Election and Broadcast algorithm, all nodes can share a random seed of O(log2 n) bits that define
this starting points.
Since the adversary is oblivious to the randomness of the nodes, for each algorithm Ae in
which the Byzantine edge e′ participates it can send at most O(1) messages as the remaining
messages over that edge will be ignored. Let A′e be the modified algorithm Ae in which e′ sends
its faulty messages. Algorithm A′e still sends O(1) messages on every edge. Thus, applying
the randomized argument on the algorithms A′e1 , . . . ,A′em works in the exact same manner as
for the uncorrupted algorithms Ae1 , . . . ,Aem . Therefore all these algorithms can be scheduled in
congestion + dilation number of rounds, leading to O˜(D2) rounds.
4 Byzantine BFS
In this section we introduce an algorithm solving the Byzantine BFS problem and prove Lemma 7.
Recall that in the Byzantine BFS problem we are given a D–diameter, 3–edge connected graph
G and a source node s, and it is required to either output a BFS tree rooted at s, or alternatively
output the identity of the Byzantine edge e′ and a BFS tree in G \ {e′}.
4.1 The Algorithm
The algorithm starts by computing a linear upper bound cD for the diameter of the graph using
Theorem 2. Then it applies the algorithm of Lemma 5 to compute (c, d) BCC denoted by C for
c, d = Ô(D). Note that in the algorithm for the BCC one can omit the Leader Election phase and
use the source s as the leader. In the high level, the actual Byzantine BFS algorithm has three
phases. A preliminary step in which the standard BFS algorithm is applied, a verification step
which evaluates the correctness of the constructed tree, and a termination step.
The preliminary step. The source node s applies the standard BFS algorithm for O(D) rounds.
Let τ be the round in which the BFS algorithm starts. Since we assume simultaneous wake-up, τ
is known to all vertices in V. During the BFS algorithm, every node also sends its layer number
to all its neighbors, where the source s sends layer 0. Throughout the algorithm, if a node v
receives an illegal message, it simply ignores it. Note that because the graph is 3-edge connected,
after O(D) rounds every node u receives at least one message, and thus each node has a parent
in the preliminary BFS “tree”. The goal of the next step is to verify if the BFS construction was
indeed successful.
The verification step. For a node v, let `(v) be the layer v obtained during the BFS algorithm,
and let `′(u) be the layer that v received from u ∈ N(v) over the edge (u, v) during the BFS
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algorithm. In case v did not receive any message from u during the BFS algorithm, or received a
layer `′(u) = i in round τ′ 6= τ + i, it sets `′(u) = φ, indicating that the edge (u, v) is corrupted.
Next, every node v sends to each of its neighbors u ∈ N(v) a message (ID(v), `(v)) containing
its ID and its layer `(v). The message (ID(v), `(v)) is sent to a neighbor u ∈ N(v) along all the
cycles in C that cover the edge (v, u). A node w participating in a cycle C covering the edge
e = (v, u) sends at most one message targeted from v to u. If w receives more than one distinct
message sent by v to u, it omits thse messages and sends the message φ targeted to v from u
instead. The message φ indicates a corrupted scenario.
When a node u receives a message from a node v, it waits for Ô(D) rounds for all messages
originated at v to arrive. Then u determines the correct layer of v denoted as ˜`v in the following
manner. If all messages u received through the cycles covering (u, v) are identical, and equal to
(ID(v), `′′(v)) where `′′(v) 6= φ, the node u sets ˜`(v) = `′′(v). Otherwise, u determines that the
layer `′(v) received through the edge e = (u, v) during the BFS algorithm is the correct layer ˜`(v).
The node u decides that (u, v) is Byzantine if either `′(v) = φ or `′(v) 6= ˜`(v). In such a case,
u sends this information to v using the same verification technique over the cycles in C. Once a
node v detects a Byzantine edge e = (u, v), the edge is ignored from that point on.
The termination step. In the case where in the previous step, an edge e = (u, v) was detected
by its endpoints as Byzantine, they announce that the recent BFS construction is corrupted in
the following manner. The higher-ID endpoint of e broadcasts a message containing the ID of
the edge e to all vertices in G using the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm of Theorem 2. Every
vertex v ∈ V that accepts a message containing an edge e considers the previous construction as
corrupted. If the source node s receives and accepts a broadcast message containing the identity
of an edge e, it initiates another execution of the BFS algorithm. During the BFS algorithm,
the endpoints of the declared edge e ignore all messages received over this edge (as a result,
the BFS tree will be computed in G \ {e}). Every vertex w receiving and accepting a message
regarding an edge e in this termination step, sets its output (parent in the tree) according to the
tree constructed in the second BFS application. Otherwise, w sets its output according to the first
application.
4.2 Correctness
We begin with several auxiliary claims.
Claim 45. By the end of the verification step, for every vertex u and a neighbor v ∈ N(u), the value ˜`(v)
computed by u corresponds to the correct layer `(v) obtained by v during the initial BFS computation.
Proof. First assume that (u, v) = e′ is the Byzantine edge. Since all cycles covering (u, v) do not
contain e′ = (u, v), they consist of only reliable edges. Therefore all messages u receives through
the cycles are identical, and equals to (ID(v), `(v)). By the definition of BCC, there exists at least
one cycle covering (u, v) in C, and thus u sets ˜`(v) = `(v).
Next, assume that e′ = (u, v) is reliable. By the definition of the BCC, w.h.p., at least one
cycle C covering (u, v) does not contain the Byzantine edge e′. Hence, if all messages v received
through the cycles are identical and are not equal to φ, they are equal to (ID(v), `(v)) and
therefore ˜`v = `(v). Otherwise, u sets ˜`(v) = `′(v) where `′(v) is the value received over the
edge (u, v). Since (u, v) is reliable it holds that `′(v) = `(v).
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Using Claim 45 we can also conclude that an edge is detected during the verification step
only if it is indeed the Byzantine edge.
Corollary 46. If a node u detects an edge (u, v) as corrupted in the verification step it holds that (u, v) =
e′ is indeed the Byzantine edge.
Proof. By Claim 45 at the end of the verification step it holds that u computed the correct layer
`(v) obtained by v in the initial BFS computation. The edge (u, v) was detected by u as Byzantine
in one of the following cases: (i) ˜`(v) is different than the message `′(v) that u received over the
edge (u, v) (ii) `′(v) = φ when u did not receive any layer information from v, or (iii) `′(v) = φ
when u received a message on layer i from v in a round that is different than τ+ i. We claim that
indeed these cases indicate that (u, v) is Byzantine. In (i), as ˜`(v) = `(v) by Claim 45, the received
message `′(v) through (u, v) is indeed corrupted. In (ii), the algorithm calls for all neighbors to
send their layer information and thus an edge not obeying this rule is corrupted. Finally, in
(iii), in a valid BFS computation, nodes should receive a message on layer i only in round τ + i.
Note that this case requires the simultaneous wake-up assumption which is needed here for the
correctness proof of Claim 48. In all these cases we can safely conclude that the edge (u, v) is
Byzantine.
Our next goal is to show that in the case where the Byzantine edge e′ was not detected during
the verification step, the BFS tree computed in the first step is correct. Let H =
⋃
u(u, p(u)) be
the set of edges defined in the first application of the BFS algorithm. We first claim that H is a
spanning tree of V.
Claim 47. The set of edges H obtained during the BFS algorithm forms a spanning tree of V.
Proof. We first note that because the graph G is 2-edge connected after 2D rounds every vertex
v ∈ V defines a parent p(v) and a layer `(v). In addition, due to Claim 45 by the end of the
verification step all vertices in V have learned the layers of their neighbors. Because the edge e′
was not detected, ∀v ∈ V it holds that `(v) = `(p(v)) + 1. Therefore H does not contain cycles.
We are left to show that every vertex v ∈ V has a path from s to v in H. Since each node defines
a single parent and H has no cycles, for a vertex v ∈ V the path Pv = [v, p(v), p(p(v)), . . . , v0] is
a simple path in H. Assume towards contradiction that s /∈ Pv and denote the Byzantine edge
by e′ = (v1, v2). Since s /∈ Pv, the path Pv must origin at the Byzantine edge (v1, v2). W.l.o.g.
v1 appears before v2 in Pv and therefore p(v1) = v2 and p(v2) 6= v1 (otherwise, the edge would
have been detected in the verification step). Since H does not contain cycles, we conclude that
the path [v2, p(v2), p(p(v2)), . . .] does not contain the edge e′ = (v1, v2) and therefore originates
at s. This implies that Pv also originate at s contradicting the assumption that s /∈ Pv.
Claim 48. If the Byzantine edge e′ was not detected during the verification step, then H is a BFS tree
rooted at s in G.
Proof. By Claim 47, H is a spanning tree of V. For i = 0, 1, . . . , D let Li(H) = {v ∈ V | `(v) = i}
and denote by Li(G) = {v ∈ V | distG(s, v) = i}. We show by induction on i that Li(H) = Li(G)
and therefore H is a BFS tree rooted at s in G. For i = 0, at the beginning of the algorithm the only
vertex that sets its layer to be 0 is s and therefore L0(H) = L0(G) = {s}. Assume the claim holds
for every j ≤ i− 1 and we will show correctness for layer i. Let v ∈ Li(H). Due to the verification
step it holds that `(p(v)) = i− 1, and v received the message from p(v) in round τ+ i− 1. By the
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induction assumption p(v) ∈ Li−1(H) = Li−1(G). Thus, due to the edge (v, p(v)) it holds that
v ∈ Li−2(G) ∪ Li−1(G) ∪ Li(G). Assume that v ∈ Li−1(G) and it is at distance i− 1 from s. Thus,
v has a neighbor w at distance i− 2 from s, and due to the induction assumption w ∈ Li−2(H)
and `(w) = i − 2. Hence, v received the layer `′(w) = `(w) = i − 2 from w in round τ + i − 2
before it received the message from p(v) in round τ + i − 1. Therefore the node v would have
set its layer to be `(v) = i − 1, in contradiction to the assumption that v ∈ Li(H). The same
argument also holds for the case where v ∈ Li−2(G). We therefore conclude that v ∈ Li(G) and
Li(H) ⊆ Li(G).
For the other direction, let v ∈ Li(G) be a vertex at distance i from s. Hence, v has a neighbor
w ∈ Li−1(G) and by the induction assumption w ∈ Li−1(H). By Claim 45, v received the correct
layer `′(w) = `(w) = i− 1 from w. Moreover, since the edge (v, w) was not detected as Byzantine,
v received the message `(w) in round τ + i− 1. By the induction assumption for every j < i it
holds that Lj(H) = Lj(G). In addition, since the Byzantine edge was not detected, any message
containing layer k that v received was received in round τ + k. Therefore v did not receive any
message before round τ + i− 1 and v ∈ Li(H).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. During the first application of the standard BFS algorithm, by Claim 48 and
Corollary 46 either we constructed a BFS tree in G or the Byzantine edge e′ was detected by its
endpoints. If the Byzantine edge e′ was not detected, we constructed a legal output, no vertex
applies the Broadcast algorithm and by Corollary 20, no message is accepted by the vertices in
V. Thus, in this case we output a BFS tree rooted at s in G.
If the Byzantine edge was detected during the verification step, one of its endpoints broadcast
the edge ID using the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm. By Theorem 2 all vertices in V accepts the
message and the iteration is considered as corrupted. In addition, the source node s applies the
BFS algorithm once more. Since the Byzantine edge is ignored by both endpoints (once detected),
in the second application of the BFS algorithm we obtain a BFS tree rooted at s in G \ {e′}.
Running Time. Executing the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm requires O˜(D2) rounds. By Lemma 5
constructing the BCC requires Ô(D2) rounds. The standard BFS algorithm is performed in O(D)
rounds. During the verification step, due to the dilation and congestion bounds of the cycles in
C, sending the messages on all the cycles requires Ô(D3) rounds. Hence, the total running time
of the algorithm is Ô(D3).
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A Missing Details for Cycle Cover Constructions
Claim 49. The low-congestion cycle cover algorithmA can be modified such that each cycle C has a unique
identifier ID(C) of Ô(1) bits. In the distributed output of the algorithm, each node u knows ID(C) for
every cycle C that passes through u.
Proof. The reader is referred to the centralized constructions of the cycle covers in [30] and their
distributed implementation in [32] for complete details. We will next explain the minor modifica-
tions required to assign cycles unique IDs. Let T be a BFS tree rooted at an arbitrary vertex. The
algorithm has two main procedures, for covering the non-tree edges in E \ T and for covering T.
We start with the simpler case of assigning unique IDs for the cycles covering the non-tree edges.
By Claim 5 (2) in [32], each non-tree edge appears on a unique cycle. In addition, by construction
each cycle has Ô(1) non-tree edges11. Thus the identifier of each such cycle C is made by the list
of Ô(1) non-tree edges ordered in increasing IDs. (The ID of an edge e = (u, v) is the O(log n)
string ID(u), ID(v) where w.l.o.g. ID(u) < ID(v)).
We next describe how to define unique IDs for the cycles computed in the tree covering
procedure. The algorithm of [30] starts by defining for every edge e = (u, p(u)) a swap edge
e′ = (x, y) where p(u) is the parent of u in the tree. The algorithm then defines a virtual edge
(u, s(u)) where s(u) ∈ {x, y} is carefully chosen, and each node u knows its s(u) mate. See Fig.
7 in [30]. The edges (u, s(u)) are covered by applying a recursive balanced partitioning of T into
two trees T1, T2. The edge (u, s(u)) is handled at the point where u and s(u) belong to different
trees, namely, T′1 and T
′
2. At this point, the algorithm considers all nodes u in T
′
1 that have their
second endpoint s(u′) in T′2 and vice-versa. All these nodes in T′1 get matched by applying the
TreeEdgeDisjointPath Algorithm. This process defines virtual edges internal to T′2, where each
virtual edge corresponds to exactly two (u, s(u)) edges. The ID of each such virtual edge will
be the concatenation of these two edge IDs (u, s(u)) and (u′, s(u′)). The virtual edges are then
covered by applying the non-tree covering algorithm in the tree T′2. By the description above
each cycle contains Ô(1) non-tree edges. In our case, the non-tree edge is a virtual edge whose
ID correspond to two edge IDs. Thus, the ID of the cycle can again be repesented using Ô(1)
many bits.
11It is 21/e in the description in [30], but e is chosen to be 1/
√
log n
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